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tion of aircraft, missiles, or naval vessels, or after December 31, 1963, to or for the use of any armed force of the United States for any research, development, test, or evaluation, or after December 31, 1965, to or for the use of any armed force of the United States for the procurement of tracked combat vehicles, unless the appropriation of such funds has been authorized by legislation enacted after such dates.

"Sec. 305. No funds may be appropriated after June 30, 1966, to or for the use of any armed force of the United States for use as an emergency fund for research, development, test, and evaluation, or procurement or production related thereto unless the appropriation of such funds has been authorized by legislation enacted after that date.

"Sec. 306. Section 8074 of title 10, United States Code, is amended by adding the following new subsection at the end thereof:

"(c) The Military Air Transport Service is redesignated as the Military Airlift Command."

The amendment was agreed to.

The Senate bill was ordered to be read a third time, was read the third time and passed, and a motion to reconsider was laid on the table.

A similar House bill (H.R. 7657) was laid on the table.

GENERAL LEAVE TO EXTEND

Mr. RIVERS of South Carolina. Mr. Speaker, I ask unanimous consent that all Members have 5 legislative days in which to extend their remarks on the bill just passed.

The SPEAKER. Is there objection to the request of the gentleman from South Carolina?

There was no objection.

ADDITIONAL LEGISLATIVE PROGRAM

(Mr. GERALD R. FORD asked and was given permission to address the House for 1 minute and to revise and extend his remarks.)

Mr. GERALD R. FORD. Mr. Speaker, I take this time for the purpose of yielding to the distinguished majority leader, the gentleman from Oklahoma [Mr. ALBERT].

Mr. ALBERT. Mr. Speaker, I thank the gentleman for yielding.

Mr. Speaker, I am taking this time, after conversing with the distinguished minority leader, to announce first of all an addition to the program.

The gentleman from North Carolina [Mr. BONNER], chairman of the Committee on Merchant Marine and Fisheries, advises that he will undertake to call up under unanimous consent the bill H.R. 7855 to authorize additional funds for the construction of 17 small Coast Guard vessels.

And, Mr. Speaker, if the gentleman from Michigan will yield further, I would like to advise that we have made such good progress today, thanks to two committees which have expeditiously handled two very important bills, if we can finish the NASA authorization bill and the transportation bill which have already been scheduled for tomorrow, it will be my purpose to ask that we adjourn over until Monday next.

HOUR OF MEETING ON TOMORROW

In order to attempt to do this, Mr. Speaker, I ask unanimous consent that when the House adjourns today it adjourn to meet at 11 o'clock tomorrow.

The SPEAKER. Is there objection to the request of the gentleman from Oklahoma?

There was no objection.

PERSONAL EXPLANATION

Mr. MEEDS. Mr. Speaker, at the time of the taking of rollcall No. 90 on yesterday on H.R. 2985, I was unavoidably detained. Had I been present and voting I would have voted "aye."

PERSONAL EXPLANATION

Mr. ADAMS. Mr. Speaker, on rollcall No. 90 on yesterday which was taken on H.R. 2985, I was unavoidably detained. Had I been present and voting I would have voted "aye."

PERSONAL EXPLANATION

Mr. FOLEY. Mr. Speaker, on rollcall No. 90 on H.R. 2985, I was unavoidably detained. Had I been present and voting I would have voted "aye."

CITIZEN'S WHITE PAPER ON
VIETNAM

(Mr. RYAN asked and was given permission to extend his remarks at this point in the Record and to include extraneous matter.)

Mr. RYAN. Mr. Speaker, the situation in Vietnam is one of the most complex issues ever to be before this Congress and this Government. In order to aid the Members of the Congress in their deliberations concerning this vital issue, I wish to bring to their attention a recent paper. This paper, entitled "A Citizen's White Paper on American Policy in Vietnam and Southeast Asia," was written by Marcus Raskin, codirector of the Institute for Policy Studies. I believe that it is a keen analysis of our policy in southeast Asia and its historical background, and I include it herewith:

A CITIZEN'S WHITE PAPER ON AMERICAN
POLICY IN VIETNAM AND SOUTHEAST ASIA
(By Marcus G. Raskin)

In 1943 at the Cairo Conference and then again at the Teheran Conference, President Roosevelt stated that American and Indochinese interests were best served by Indochina losing its status as a French colony and becoming a U.N. trusteeship area. It was to become what some now call a "neutralized area." Roosevelt said that the area had been milked dry for 100 years by the French, and that that was quite enough. However, by March 1945, the French wanted Indochina back in a quasi-colonial status.

Originally, this proposal did not meet with American approval, but by 1946 the United States acquiesced. It was not the time to alienate the French when it appeared that the American-Soviet split was irreparable, and American planners wanted to forge the Western Alliance.

In Vietnam other forces were at work. Immediately after the surrender of Japan, Ho Chi Minh, the nationalist Communist

leader, established a government and declared Vietnam's independence. The French Communists advised Ho Chi Minh to go slow and not to act in haste to the detriment of the French Communist Party.

The French Government, with the support of the French Communist Party, fought Ho Chi Minh. Stalin at first adhered to the French Communist line and refused to recognize Ho Chi Minh's Republic of Vietnam. In December 1946, Maurice Thorez, the Communist Vice President of France, countersigned the order for "military action" against the Republic of Vietnam. Even after the French Communist Party tempered its opposition to Ho the Russians still refused to recognize or give support to Ho.

In May 1950, the United States and France worked out the contours of the Schuman plan, an attempt to fashion a coal and steel cartel for Europe which was thought to be one more concrete step in the dream of a united West Europe tied to the United States. Coincident with this plan, Dean Acheson and Robert Schuman, the French Foreign Minister, joined in announcing the new American involvement in Vietnam. After all, if a Western community was to come into being, and the United States intended to be its leader, then, it was said, we had to "share responsibilities" in non-European states that the West Europeans once controlled. In Indochina that meant:

1. Primary responsibility would continue to rest with France and the people of Indochina;

2. U.S. aid would be given to promote and restore "security" and the "genuine development of nationalism"; and

3. U.S. aid would go to France and the associated states of Indochina "in order to assist them in restoring stability and permitting these states to pursue their peaceful and democratic development.

Of course this meant that the United States could deal directly and openly in the Indochinese area. Although estimates vary, American aid to France for Vietnam totaled about \$1 billion between the summer of 1950 and the spring of 1954. But the French, who until 1954 had primary responsibility there, were unable to organize indigenous political groups that would rally around either the French puppets or the American cause of anticommunism.

In January 1953, President Eisenhower held a review of Indochinese policy. The Eisenhower administration thought that the ingredient which the French needed to win the Indochinese war was a comprehensive military plan. He made increased American aid contingent on effecting such a plan. Named after Gen. Henri-Eugene Navarre, the plan called for the creation of indigenous forces to undertake garrison duties so that French forces could be released for an all-out military effort. It was no more successful than any of the other plans, and by May of 1954 the French had lost their military position in Vietnam at Dienbienphu.

Between January and May of 1954, the French, British, and Russians undertook exploratory talks to bring the war in Vietnam to a close. This drew strong opposition from Secretary of State Dulles, Senate Majority Leader Knowland, Assistant Secretary of State for Far Eastern Affairs Walter Robertson, Admiral Radford, and Vice President Nixon, who pushed hard for "united action" against the forces of Ho Chi Minh. Mr. Dulles used Life magazine as his instrument to say that the allies should be prepared to risk a war with China. He was undismayed by the possibility of Chinese forces entering Indochina to engage the white Western Powers. Yet, this did not reflect Eisenhower's view. He was much more reticent about a land war in Asia, as was General Ridgway, the Chief of Staff of the Army. After the United States sent 200 Air Force technicians

to Indochina, Eisenhower said that he could conceive of no greater tragedy than the United States becoming involved in a war in Indochina. The Western Powers and President Eisenhower, over Dulles' objections, dropped the idea of united action, for the British were uninterested, the American people were just recovering from the Korean trauma, and the French desperately needed peace. Indeed, Pierre Mendes France had come to power on the promise that he could make peace in Indochina.

In 1954 the great issue for the West European states was the creation of a European Defense Community (EDC). The United States bent all its efforts to EDC's creation, for it meant a substantial step in the unification of West Europe. The French, however, had grave doubts about the EDC. They feared the rearming of West Germany, either independently or as the major element in a united West European Army, because it might have meant a possible German hegemony over West Europe. The Russians felt the same way. Seeing the possibility of a diplomatic success, they offered to intercede with Ho Chi Minh in exchange for a French vote against the European Defense Community. Pierre Mendes-France delivered the French Assembly. And, in exchange, Russia pressured the Vietnamese into a peace conference at Geneva, when Ho believed he could have won control of all of Vietnam without having to arrive at a negotiated settlement.

The Geneva conference turned out to be typical in the history of diplomacy in the 20th century. No nation wanted to be there, but all knew that something had to be done. In attendance were Cambodia, the Democratic Republic of Vietnam, France, Laos, Communist China, the state of Vietnam, the U.S.S.R., Great Britain, and the United States. The conference dealt with all three states of Indochina. It stated that no military base could be established by foreign powers in Vietnam and that the purpose of the Vietnamese part of the agreement was to settle a military question. The military demarcation line (the 17th parallel) was not to be "interpreted as constituting a political or territorial boundary." Furthermore, article 7 of the declaration permitted the Vietnamese people "to enjoy the fundamental freedoms guaranteed by democratic institutions established as a result of free general elections by secret ballot." An election was to have been held in July 1956 "under the supervision of an international commission composed of representatives of the member states of the International Supervisory Commission."

Article 8 provided that "The provisions of the agreements on the cessation of hostilities intended to insure the protection of individuals and of property must be most strictly applied, and must, in particular, allow everyone in Vietnam to decide freely in which zone he wishes to live."

The United States took note but did not sign the final declaration of the Conference. Instead, Undersecretary of State Walter Bedell Smith read a statement saying that the United States would "(1) refrain from the threat of the use of force to disturb them, in accordance with Article 2(4) of the Charter of the United Nations dealing with the obligation of members to refrain in their international relations from the threat or use of force; and (2) it would view any renewal of the aggression in violation of the aforesaid agreements with grave concern and as seriously threatening international peace and security."

South Vietnam was not a signatory and stated at the Conference that it was not bound by the Geneva accords.

The French, on the other hand, were not dissatisfied with the agreement since their primary purpose was to get out. They hoped that once the dust settled a bit, political parties would form in Vietnam and a democratic nation would emerge from the pro-

jected elections of 1956. But this hope was not regarded as a vital French interest. French foreign policy in Vietnam was now dictated by the need to end French domestic instability, since many politicians believed that the demoralization of the French people and the precarious state of the economy were caused by colonial policies in Indochina and Algeria.

II

In 1954 the United States was dominated in its foreign policy thinking by those who view Communist nations rhetorically as implacable enemies to be liberated and contained. In reality, however, the Eisenhower administration pursued an accommodation bargain by negotiating a stand-off in Korea with the Chinese and North Koreans a scant year before. The State Department in July, 1954, looked for a line of resistance in Southeast Asia against "communism," much in the manner that was developed in Europe. Dulles thought that through the formation of a separate state—South Vietnam had finally found that line in Indochina.

The United States found a man, Ngo Dinh Diem, who could help in establishing that line. Diem, who lived in the Maryknoll Seminars in the United States from 1950 to 1953, was sponsored by Cardinal Spellman and various liberal American Catholic politicians (e.g., Senator John F. Kennedy and Senator MIKE MANSFIELD were strong supporters of Diem). In a complicated maneuver aimed at aligning South Vietnam to its side, the United States pressured Bao Dai, the playboy puppet of France, into backing Diem against General Le Van Vien, a warlord who operated gambling, narcotics, and prostitution in South Vietnam through the powerful Binh Xuyen, a crime syndicate; and General Hinh, who had been the first choice of Bao Dai and the French for Vietnamese political leadership. To show its seriousness of purpose in establishing the line of resistance, the United States had formed the Southeast Asia Treaty Organization (SEATO) alliance.

The pact was a guarantee by Western powers to "consult immediately in order to agree on the measures which should be taken for the common defense" where political integrity or independence was under attack. Dulles hoped to use the alliance to protect the newly created state of South Vietnam. However, the SEATO treaty had virtually no operational meaning or utility since the last thing that the European signatories of the treaty wanted was to get involved militarily in Vietnam.

During the early part of his regime, Diem seemed to be securing his own power and creating a national identity for South Vietnam. He was able to isolate General Hinh by deflating any support he had, while controlling the political and economic operations of the Binh Xuyen, which strangled the city of Saigon and the countryside. On the other hand, in North Vietnam the Communists, copying Chinese methods, instituted a harsh tax system and committed atrocities and wholesale murder against the landlords, bourgeois, and peasants in their attempts to enforce collectivization and political conformity in the North. The Geneva accords provided for free movement of Vietnamese from one part of Vietnam to the other. Hundreds of thousands of people fled North Vietnam, and in that process it was emptied of a potential resistance to Ho. The experiences of these refugees seemed to serve as the basis for a unifying bond against communism in the South Vietnamese nation. Many thousands of Catholics left the North for the South because of their hope in Diem and material aid from the Catholic church. And Diem, the Central Vietnamese Catholic, needed active support of Vietnamese Catholics from the North to survive in South Vietnam, among the Buddhist majority.

In October 1955 Diem held an election in which the people were to choose between Bao Dai, the absentee playboy, and himself. Upon winning that election by a fraudulent 97-percent majority, Diem formally proclaimed a new state—the Republic of Vietnam. This move ended any possibility of an election for all of Vietnam: an election that both Diem and the United States feared would have resulted in a victory for the North Vietnamese.

Ho Chi Minh's government resigned itself to the existence and stability of South Vietnam. In the early years of the Diem regime the North Vietnamese emphasis was on consolidation in their zone. Indeed, such consolidation was necessary. In November of 1956 the North Vietnamese peasants staged a revolt similar in intent to the Hungarian revolution. Ho admitted excesses, but continued many of them.

What turned the wheel of fortune against South Vietnam and the West were the internal policies of Diem's government. In 1956 he staged a crackdown on the Chinese living in South Vietnam: those Chinese not born in South Vietnam were disallowed from owning businesses in 11 major categories deemed vital to the economic life of South Vietnam. Diem estimated that the Chinese comprised 10 percent of the nation, and yet they owned two-thirds of its businesses. Rice exports came to a virtual halt as a result of Chinese reprisal to Diem's move. To further secure his power base in the South Vietnamese Government, Buddhists were systematically excluded and replaced by Catholics, while Catholicism became the officially favored religion. The Buddhist majority became the object of petty annoyance and persecution.

In 1957 Diem reorganized the police and placed on the Government payroll a huge net of informers. Diem's brother, Nhu, proceeded to rid the Diem oligarchy of any person who did not favor the Diem government. Diem also took the advice of American experts who said that the Viet Minh controlled between 40 and 70 percent of the villages which were not run by the religious sects, the Cao Daiists, Buddhists, or Catholics. The Americans argued that the Viet Minh was a threat to the internal security of the state and would ultimately undermine Diem's rule. "The de facto integration of South Vietnam within the American military defense structure implied that the region ought to be secure; and hence, ought to be purged of anything which might, however remotely, serve the Red cause." (Philippe Devillers.)

By 1958, Diem's police actions were transformed into military operations. The Government, now with the active military support of the United States, began pacifying outlying areas. The methods which they used were not dissimilar to those used by the North Vietnamese a few years earlier in their treacherous pacification operation. Arrests, torture, plundering, and "regroupment" came to be the order of the day. These tactics greatly alienated the peasants and farmers, since Diem seemed to be offering only torture without reform, or even ideology. In December of 1958, after the death of a score of prisoners in one of Diem's concentration camps, armed bands of rebels sprung up in South Vietnam. Their support by the peasants and the villagers was assured by Diem's behavior.

III

The foreign policy of Communist nations is traditionally conservative when it comes to foreign military involvements. The Communists and rebels in South Vietnam forced the hand of the North Vietnamese government to become active militarily. Until 1960, the North Vietnamese restricted their efforts to plaintive diplomatic notes to Diem. These notes invariably included demands for the restoration of communication (rail, post, sea, and trade) between the South and the North,

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confirms, and reiterates the Lassiter decision.

Mr. SPARKMAN. The decision said the States had broad powers to determine the qualifications of its voters.

Mr. HILL. That is correct.

To continue with the quotation:

Franklin v. Harper, 205 Ga. 779, 55 S. Ed. 2d, 221, appeal dismissed 339 U.S. 946, 70 S. Ct. 804, 94 L. Ed. 1361. It was said last century in Massachusetts that a literacy test was designed to insure an "independent and intelligent" exercise of the right of suffrage. *Stone v. Smith*, 159 Mass. 413-414, 34 N.E. 521. North Carolina agrees. We do not sit in judgment on the wisdom of that policy. We cannot say, however, that it is not an allowable one measured by constitutional standards.

"The ability to read and write likewise has some relation to standards designed to promote intelligent use of the ballot," the Court said. Is this sentence difficult to understand? It says plainly and clearly that literacy tests have a relation to standards designed for intelligent use of the ballot.

The Lassiter case was decided on March 13, 1963. At that time all of the present members of the Supreme Court were members. Note, if you will, that the case of Lassiter against Northampton is cited in the opinion with approval not just once but again so that this Court again ratified and approved that decision that says a State may regulate voting so long as it does not discriminate by reason of race or color.

It may be well here to state the names of some of the members of the Court who have in the past affirmed the constitutionality of the State passing on voter qualifications. It is a "Who's Who" in great and learned men—Justices Hughes, McReynolds, Sutherland, Stone—at whose feet I was privileged to sit when he was Dean of the School of Law at New York University—Justices McKenna, John Marshall Harlan, Oliver Wendell Holmes, Cardozo, Roberts, Brandeis, Butler, White, and many others.

Could there be a greater or more brilliant roll of great judges than those on the list I have read, confirming the right of the States to fix the qualifications of voters? Two months ago the Court again confirmed that right, in the case cited by the Senator from Alabama.

Were they all wrong? Did none of these Justices have a feeling for the Constitution—for the rights of American citizens? Did they all feel that an individual had rights protected but not granted under the Constitution? Apparently they did for I find no dissents.

Do the present members of the Court now feel otherwise? They did not 2 years ago when they reaffirmed Lassiter against Northampton. Would the Attorney General have us believe that the Court has had a change of heart in 2 years, when 2 years ago civil rights acts dealing with voting were law and within their judicial knowledge? When voting cases had been before that Court? When the Court had had ample opportunity to decide, declare, and legislate in this field and failed to do so, but instead reaffirmed its past decisions that qualifications of voters—a literacy test—is a State function? If the Attorney General is so positive, as he was in all of his testimony, that this present bill is con-

stitutional, where does he go for his crystal ball gazing? Does he go to the floor of the House of Representatives and witness the ovations and enthusiastic applause the members of the Supreme Court give the President in response to his voter legislation proposals?

Who told the Attorney General? On what basis can he declare this legislation in the teeth of an opinion 2 years old? What has changed since then? One thing; we have had demonstrations in the streets, in the Capital of this country, in the White House, and along a 50-mile stretch of highway but nothing has changed in the law.

Mr. President, throughout the hearings on this voting rights legislation the Attorney General repeatedly justified his position on behalf of the bill by referring to a "living Constitution"—one which defines equal justice under the law as singling out a few States for arbitrary and punitive treatment, a Constitution that declares all who come under it guilty until they prove themselves innocent.

I find it difficult to adopt this new "living Constitution," as the Attorney General calls it, and the weird concepts of law and justice therein. I would rather stay with what the Attorney General must consider the "dead" Constitution, the one that the founders of this Nation pledged their lives, their fortunes, and their sacred honor to. Our Constitution was not written in a day, and I do not think we should try to rewrite it in a day. There are those who want revolutionary changes in all phases of life, but such changes cannot and will not last unless they are evolutionary, that is, unless they come about by orderly processes. The task is hard and the way may be long, but the promise of freedom is the great gift of this Nation, and our freedoms have not been won overnight. Freedoms come and are protected by good order—vigorous debate—people of good will working together for the common good of all, not for a few.

Mr. President, in this speech I have not endeavored to dwell in detail on every line and section of S. 1564, the bill before us, and to expose each and every drastic, arbitrary, discriminatory, and punitive provision of it. I shall continue my arguments at another time. Suffice it to say now, however, that I oppose S. 1564 and any other legislation as drastic, as arbitrary and as punitive as it.

Two hundred years ago, Mr. President, before our Nation ever came into being, Rousseau wrote "The Social Contract." He wrote of the dissolution of the state and how it could come about. He wrote this:

The same thing happens when the members of the government severally usurp the power they should exercise only as a body; this is as great an infraction of the law, and results in even greater disorders. There are then, so to speak, as many princes as there are magistrates, and the state, no less divided than the government, either perishes or changes its form.

When the state is dissolved, the abuse of government, whatever it is, bears the common name of anarchy. To distinguish, democracy degenerates into ochlocracy, and aristocracy into oligarchy; and I would add that royalty degenerates into tyranny; but

this last word is ambiguous and needs explanation.

The body politic, as well as the human body, begins to die as soon as it is born, and carries in itself the causes of its destruction. But both may have a constitution that is more or less robust and suited to preserve them a longer or a shorter time. The constitution of man is the work of nature; that of the state, the work of art. It is not in men's power to prolong their own lives; but it is for them to prolong as much as possible the life of the state, by giving it the best possible constitution. The best constituted state will have an end; but it will end later than any other, unless some unforeseen accident brings about its untimely destruction.

Let not the passage of this bill, this S. 1564, be that "unforeseen accident."

Let us not be parties to bringing about "its untimely destruction."

Let us not avoid the Constitution nor destroy it.

Let us not be sold a bill of goods mislabeled and misconceived.

I say again to my colleagues in the Senate and to all the people in all sections of this great Nation: "Caveat emptor"—"buyer beware."

I implore the members of this body and the people in all sections of this great Nation, regardless of sectional differences and philosophical viewpoints, to put above all things the need for adherence to law and order and the integrity of our constitutional system.

For, if we lose these, we have lost our soul as a nation.

MESSAGE FROM THE HOUSE

A message from the House of Representatives, by Mr. Bartlett, one of its reading clerks, announced that the House had passed a joint resolution (H.J. Res. 447) making a supplemental appropriation for the fiscal year ending June 30, 1965, for military functions of the Department of Defense, and for other purposes, in which it requested the concurrence of the Senate.

HOUSE JOINT RESOLUTION REFERRED

The joint resolution (H.J. Res. 447) making a supplemental appropriation for the fiscal year ending June 30, 1965, for military functions of the Department of Defense, and for other purposes, was read twice by its title and referred to the Committee on Appropriations.

ORDER OF BUSINESS—ADDITIONAL APPROPRIATIONS TO MEET MILITARY REQUIREMENTS

Mr. SPARKMAN obtained the floor.

Mr. MANSFIELD. Mr. President, will the Senator from Alabama yield to me, without losing his right to the floor?

Mr. SPARKMAN. I yield under those conditions.

Mr. MANSFIELD. Mr. President, the special appropriation measure has passed the House, has been received in the Senate, has been referred to the appropriate committee, and will be on the floor for consideration, under the unanimous-consent agreement agreed to yesterday, at 3:30.

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I ask unanimous consent that at 3:15, at the conclusion of the speech of the distinguished Senator from Alabama [Mr. SPARKMAN], there be a live quorum call, so that at 3:30 the Senate may begin consideration of the special appropriation measure under the specified time limitation.

The PRESIDING OFFICER (Mr. KENNEDY of New York in the chair). Is there objection? The Chair hears none, and it is so ordered.

Mr. MANSFIELD. Mr. President, if the Senator from Alabama will yield further—

Mr. SPARKMAN. I am glad to yield to the Senator from Montana, under the same conditions as before.

Mr. MANSFIELD. This matter has been discussed with the distinguished minority leader, with the distinguished Senator from Oregon [Mr. MORSE], who will have charge of half the time, and the Senator from Mississippi [Mr. STENNIS], who has been delegated by the chairman of the committee to handle the rest of the time.

It is anticipated that approximately 3 hours will be spent on the joint resolution this afternoon and evening.

Tomorrow, immediately after the morning prayer, the Senate will return to the special appropriation resolution until it is completed.

Mr. President, to emphasize what I have said, immediately after the morning prayer tomorrow the Senate will resume consideration of the special appropriation measure. There will be no morning business.

Following disposition of the appropriation measure, under the unanimous-consent agreement of today, the Senate will then revert to the Ervin amendment.

Mr. President, while this procedure is a little extraordinary, it is made mandatory because of the fact that a number of Senators were of the opinion that the joint resolution would not come up until tomorrow. Therefore, in the interests of comity, I believe that nothing will be lost by it because Senators will have an opportunity to study the Record overnight.

I repeat the announcement that the 5 hours under the unanimous-consent agreement will be used today and tomorrow, and there will be no morning hour tomorrow.

I thank the Senator from Alabama [Mr. SPARKMAN] for yielding to me to make these comments.

ORDER FOR RECESS

Mr. MANSFIELD. Mr. President, I ask unanimous consent that when the Senate completes its business today, it stand in recess until 12 o'clock noon tomorrow.

The PRESIDING OFFICER. Without objection, it is so ordered.

VOTING RIGHTS ACT OF 1965

The Senate resumed the consideration of the bill (S. 1564) to enforce the 15th amendment of the Constitution of the United States.

Mr. SPARKMAN. Mr. President, I shall analyze the voting rights proposal before this body on a section-by-section basis. While I intend to fight its adoption at every turn, I wish it clearly understood that I firmly believe in the right of every qualified person to vote. However, I believe that this right should be exercised under State, not Federal laws. In this belief I am strongly supported by the very source of Federal law, the U.S. Constitution.

In the course of my speech, I expect to show how our Founding Fathers sought to prevent passage of laws under the pressure of emotional demonstrations. I wish to caution my colleagues about the kind of legislation before us and the atmosphere in which it is engendered. I wish also to touch upon the grave responsibilities now resting on the shoulders of all Members of Congress to avoid heated passion and to act for the good of the preservation of our form of government, as well as the Constitution itself, as a guiding instrument in our national life.

We have heard on various occasions, in this great Chamber throughout our history, that we are at the crossroads of either preserving our traditions of government or plunging out into uncharted seas. Members of this body have heard the eloquent voices of many men, including Daniel Webster, warn in most scholarly and impassioned terms against casting aside the structure as well as the spirit of the Constitution.

I do not speak as an alarmist, but I say in all candor that never in my 28 years of active service in both the House of Representatives and the Senate, have I seen a proposal so bent upon changing the spirit as well as the letter of our form of government, all under the guise and in the name of providing the right to vote to all qualified citizens, a basic premise with which I agree.

Let me add that during all the time I have been a Member of this body I have never seen a bill which I considered more in opposition to the Constitution of the United States than this one. It violates the principle, the letter, and the law of the Constitution in so many different respects that I cannot see how it can possibly ever be held to be constitutional.

This bill, however, would grasp upon a purposely designed intense sequence of public demonstrations in my own State of Alabama, and would bypass the normal method of letting the courts determine where and how discrimination in voting exists. It would expand an emotional so-called march as though it were a balloon, and would use it as a justification for the most harsh punitive measure on State governments that I have seen in this Nation, short of actual military occupation.

This measure is fraught with iniquitous consequences. Let us not ignore this merely to accommodate mass demonstration demands. Let us look at this measure in terms of whether the little good that may be accomplished can, in all fairness to justice and democracy, justify the terrible consequences on our form of government and the Constitution. If we do not do this—if we do not look at every

word and sentence of this bill to see just what it really means, we are not fulfilling our oaths and we certainly are out of step with the history of Congress on the point of not wishing to pass legislation because the pressures and anxieties of the moment are aroused by mass demonstrations demanding more and more legislative action when the demonstrators themselves do not respect existing law and, in fact, seem to wish not to use the full powers of existing law unless they agree exactly with what they want.

I should like to emphasize that Congress moved out of Philadelphia in June 1783 to avoid further mass demonstrations like the one it faced on June 21, 1783, when a large number of troops who had mutinied and were demonstrating in the streets with guns, surrounded the statehouse in which Congress was sitting and demanded that they be paid by Pennsylvania State authorities. Congress, in fear of bodily harm, petitioned George Washington to send in regular troops to protect them. Then the demonstrators repented and asked for forgiveness, promising to help protect Congress rather than to demonstrate and mutiny.

Congress—then called the Continental Congress—did not like the atmosphere nor the exigencies of the moment and passed a resolution on June 24 to move to Princeton, N.J. The language of this resolution is important to us here today; it is filled with timely meaning. I will quote it: "In order that further and more effectual measures may be taken for suppressing the present revolt and maintaining the dignity and authority of the United States."

In other words, Congress moved to Princeton and away from the pressure of mass demonstrations to maintain the dignity and authority of the United States. If we now respond to the highly planned and purposely called demonstrations in Alabama and elsewhere by enacting the proposed voting rights bill just because Martin Luther King says that we must, we will be doing the exact opposite of maintaining the dignity and authority of the United States. We will be doing what the Continental Congress of 1783 told us that we should not do.

As a matter of fact, Mr. President, we are in the District of Columbia at this very moment simply because those early Congresses and our Founding Fathers of the Constitution wanted Congress to be removed from the pressures of mass demonstrations and independent of the police powers of a sovereign State. The strong feeling of the resolution of 1783, which I just quoted a moment ago, held over to the Constitutional Convention and resulted in the 17th clause of section 8 of article I of the Constitution, which I will read:

The Congress shall have power—to exercise exclusive legislation in all cases whatsoever over such district (not exceeding ten miles square) as many by cession of particular states, and the acceptance of Congress, become the seat of government of the United States, and to exercise like authority over all places purchased by the consent of the legislature of the state in which the same shall be, for the erection of forts, magazines, arsenals, dock-yards, and other needful buildings.

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and talks for elections, but little more. However, in March 1960, North Vietnamese leaders reexamined the situation in South Vietnam—in part because the Chinese had contact through Laos with the South Vietnamese rebels. The North-Vietnamese feared that they would be "mousetrapped" by the Chinese if they did not actively support the South Vietnamese rebels. The wheel of fortune was given another turn. The manifesto of the 18th, signed by leaders in the spring of 1960 who opposed Diem, appeared to make clear that he could no longer hold the support of the moderates. The stage was set for civil war. The Nam-bo Declaration, drawn by South Vietnamese rebels with the aid of North Vietnamese leaders, also in the spring of 1960, detailed the list of grievances against the Diem government. It stated that the Veterans of the Resistance Association would fight to end the Diem regime and "to set up a democratic government of National Union in South Vietnam—in order to realize national independence and democratic liberties and to guarantee a decent life to the people."

They contended that only then could the Geneva accords be implemented.

By December 1960, the National Liberation Front of South Vietnam began officially, under its own flag, to make successful attacks on South Vietnamese military forces. By 1961 the situation had deteriorated at a faster pace than had been expected by the United States. The South Vietnamese Government expanded its repressive and punitive activities without being able to implement any effective economic or social plans for the country. The Vietcong and the National Liberation Front killed minor officials in the towns by the thousands, and stepped up their campaign to win over the peasants in South Vietnam with a "carrot and stick" policy of reform and repression. As they became more successful, their need for repression dropped off considerably.

It was in this atmosphere that the U.S. commitment to South Vietnam was greatly increased at the beginning of the Kennedy administration. President Kennedy's advisers wanted to settle Laos as a neutralist country since it was thought that the United States could not, and should not, fight in both South Vietnam and Laos. They believed that with a neutralist government in Laos under Souvanna Phouma, Diem's government could be secured. In the spring of 1961, the mission of Maxwell Taylor and Walt Rostow, then White House advisers, recommended that guerrilla tactics be used by the United States and the South Vietnamese against the rebels. Influenced by their experience in the OSS, Rostow and Roger Hilsman, soon to become Assistant Secretary of State for Far Eastern Affairs, thought that the way to beat the tactics of Gen. Vo Nguyen Giap, the Vietminh military commander, and Ho was to emulate them. However, to fight that kind of war one needed the support of the peasants, and by this time the South Vietnamese peasants were totally alienated from the central administration. Commandos were not guerrillas. On the whole, the peasants were not interested in giving support to American military advisers or to Diem's army, which had swollen to 400,000 under the insistence of the Americans who believed that a ratio of at least 10 to 1 was necessary to beat a guerrilla force. (They never got beyond 5 to 1.) Yet the economy of the country could not support a larger force. By the end of 1962, the United States was flying bombing and strafing missions against villages where there was any suspicion of Communist support. Indiscriminate bombing with napalm, and atrocities against peasants who may or may not have helped the Vietcong were commonplace. All of the Vietnamese suspicions about U.S. imperialism were now confirmed.

Although publicly the Kennedy adminis-

tration supported Diem, privately many American officials expressed great dissatisfaction with Diem, who viewed himself as the savior of South Vietnam. Americans saw him as an aloof man, controlled by his family. Indeed, the liberal American interventionists thought that if he were removed from the scene, the military, students, peasants, and Buddhists would be pacified, and the war would go better. By the fall of 1963, South Vietnam was in an uproar. The army was plotting against Diem, with American knowledge and assistance from some groups in the octopus-like American mission to South Vietnam, each of which had its own clients that it supported with material aid and advice. Buddhists were burning themselves alive in protest against Diem. (And in the American Government, high policymakers who had viewed the Buddhists as an insignificant political force went scurrying around looking for American Buddhists who could explain to them what was going on.) With the next turn of the wheel of fortune, Diem and his brother were murdered.

The military emerged with a weak strongman in January 1964, General Khanh. He alleged that some approaches had been made by Diem's brother during the last weeks of his life to North Vietnam and the Liberation Front. General Khanh, on the other hand, promised to prosecute the war to its end. That was what American policymakers in Washington and Saigon wanted to hear, since American policy was structured around the premise of a military victory against the Communists and rebels. Reformist economic and social activity was useful, but the Vietnamese operation was viewed by the American mission and General Harkins as primarily a military effort. In Washington the Vietnamese situation was looked at in more sophisticated terms. But no one knew how to express that sophistication except militarily, or in some pathetic organizational response such as fashioning a counterinsurgency group at the White House which would deal with the organization, training, and activities of guerrilla forces.

Almost no attention was paid to the consequences of military operations where whole villages were destroyed in search of one sniper. Although the United States had established its military presence with 20,000 military personnel, by the beginning of 1964 it had accomplished little else. The vast majority of engagements with the rebels, the peasants, or whoever they were, invariably ended in some measure of failure for the South Vietnamese army and its American advisers. The changeover in the top command structure of the American missions in South Vietnam changed nothing. General Taylor, the American Ambassador, and General Westmoreland, the American military commander, were as frustrated as any of their predecessors.

By the summer of 1964 events took on a slightly more ignominious quality. The American reprisal in the Gulf of Tonkin in violation of international law led to the military disaster of Bien Hoa, where at least 28 American planes were damaged or destroyed by a few guerrillas with mortars. Helicopters were destroyed by the score; thousands of people were killed monthly. By December 1964, Lt. Gen. Nguyen Khanh, who was deposed after several months in power, found himself making a bid for his return with the statement that the Vietnamese military would not fight "to carry out the policy of any foreign country." Against official American wishes, he wanted all power to the military. Formally, he lost that battle. But for interesting reasons. On February 7, the Vietcong attacked Pleiku and Camp Holloway killing and wounding 75 Americans.

The attack came while McGeorge Bundy, the President's special assistant for national security affairs, was surveying the deteriorating military situation and attempting to

compromise the differences between the competing South Vietnamese military and civil groups. He also used his stay in Vietnam to warn the North Vietnamese to stop their military involvement in the South. The Pleiku raid served as a "handle" (as it is called in government) to air attack installations in North Vietnam. This new turn of the wheel was predicated on several political and military theories. Politically it was thought that the United States had nothing to negotiate about at a diplomatic bargaining table with Ho; since it had for all practical purposes "lost" the war. Military and psychologically, the bombings were ordered and allowed in order to pacify the South Vietnamese and American military in Vietnam. The South Vietnamese military officers chafed at the American insistence that a civilian form of government be continued even if it was a facade, and feared that the United States would not expand the war thus undercutting their military and political raison d'être. On the American military side the decision to bomb North Vietnam was an attempt to show the North Vietnamese and the Chinese that they were not "paper tigers." The American military, goaded by Chinese propaganda and psychological feelings of impotence, feared that they looked like paper tigers because of their poor military showing in South Vietnam. In reviewing the comments and evidence on the matter I find that virtually no one believed that the bombing had any military value, or that the supply routes would dry up. After all, those supplies came from us. After 4½ years, the guerrillas, with the use of American weapons—and their own abilities—ended up controlling far more territory than they did at the time of the massive American military intervention in 1961. The wags of Washington were saying that if only the United States would withdraw the South Vietnamese Government's strategic position would improve since the guerrillas would not be as well supplied. Ninety percent or more of the rebel's weapons came from captured United States or South Vietnamese store depots or the black market, not from Vietnam. U Thant made this point in a more diplomatic, yet didactic way. He noted that communism could be controlled in southeast Asia if there was no American military present.

In February and March of 1965 the Buddhists, who found among their monks a penchant for politics sought ways to end the war. They initiated a peace movement under Thich Quang Lien, who held a master's degree from Yale University. His aim was that of forcing all foreign military units out of North and South Vietnam. Once the bombings in North Vietnam were increased, various nations of the world feared an escalation into a far reaching war. They did not believe the aesopian language of those who said that our responses were "measured and controlled." Indeed, the image of super rationality was exposed rather quickly when one studied the events of the war with anything more than casual interest.

For example, the use of nonlethal gas was unknown to those concerned with a controlled response, or the order to let pilots choose their own targets in North Vietnam gave many pause to wonder what control meant in that context.

The Department of State white paper had succeeded in arousing anger in many quarters because of its pedestrian quality, its failure to show how the war was controlled from the north, and hence, why it was necessary to bomb the north on a regular basis. No arguments in that flimsy document were adduced from international law, very few from the facts of the situation and none from history except that ersatz kind which men who have control of vast bureaucracies use to justify their personal (although be-

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cause of their power they are translated into institutional) actions.

In Vietnam the course of events was effected in new ways by the bombings. The United States increased its forces in South Vietnam by mid-April to over 35,000. The North Vietnamese responded rather mildly to American bombings of their country perhaps for several reasons. They did not have the air power to engage or fend off American and South Vietnamese air attacks in anything but haphazard ways. Also, North Vietnamese policy was aimed at attempting to isolate the United States on a moral level from its allies in the Western alliance and in Asia since the bombings reflected little more than military inadequacy and our seeming willingness to apply any self selected means (with little care for cost) to obtain a self-defined end.

On the political level the North Vietnamese leadership which historically favored the Soviets over the Chinese Communists wanted Soviet aid, but not Chinese intervention. The Soviet Union as in 1946, and even after the American bombings of North Vietnam while Premier Kossygin was present in North Vietnam, did not want to endanger its own relations with the United States.

In South Vietnam there was little change in the course of the war. The rebel noose around Saigon grew tighter, American quarters were bombed regularly, the American embassy was destroyed, and 75 percent or better (who really knew?) of the towns, villages and countryside were in the hands of the Vietcong. The United States sent reinforcements of Marines to places in which the whole countryside was controlled by the Vietcong. In the Da Nang area, for example, the American military garrisons were present at the sufferance of the Vietcong. American military officials openly admitted that the South Vietnamese army was unreliable: that many soldiers were Vietcong or members of the Liberation front. The Vietcong bragged that it was now not only supplied by the American forces but trained by them as well.

In France those generals who studied American military tactics at the beginning of the monsoon and rainy season of 1965 thought they witnessed a *déjà vu* to their own military campaigns which ended at Dienbienphu in May 1954.

Diplomatically, the wheel of fortune also turned. And in a way it was the final irony. By the late fall of 1964, De Gaulle and the French wanted a conference whose objective could only result in a settlement along the lines proposed by President Roosevelt in 1943 and 1944. In January 1965, it was said in Washington that the Central Intelligence Agency (CIA) or others had made approaches through intermediaries to Ho Chi Minh for negotiations, but were greeted unacceptably. Yet De Gaulle said that the Chinese and the North Vietnamese wanted to negotiate and we had better not stipulate preconditions to a conference that we needed at least as badly as the North Vietnamese. And the British, who in 1954 wanted the United States to support the Geneva Agreements, including the provision for elections, now seemed to favor continued American military involvement in southeast Asia because of the precarious situation between its creation, Malaysia, and Indonesia.

The diplomatic policy of the American Government by the end of December 1964 was almost totally militarized. Those who interested themselves in negotiation without expanding the war into North Vietnam were eclipsed by those who merely wanted to expand the war per se or who wanted to bomb and negotiate. The latter policy became the policy of the doves. The previous deterrent to a substantial military involvement in southeast Asia, war with China, seemed to become the spur or objective. "No more sanctuaries," the Chinese were warned by

American leaders, thus leaving the direct implication that the source (China) would be struck if the war continued.

The growing American involvement in Vietnam was little understood in the United States. Although Congress was silent on the course of the war, privately there was anger and disbelief at the policies of the Johnson administration. Some blamed the policies on carryovers from the Kennedy administration. They believed that the President was a neophyte in foreign affairs and had counted too heavily on the advice of the military, the CIA, State, the NSC machinery: those who had a vested interest in the militarized foreign policy. By April of 1965, newspapers, liberal and conservative, called for a definition of American aims. University professors and students held marches and "teach-ins" in favor of negotiation. The President spoke on April 8 to the American people in reply to the critics of the policy and the March 15 declaration of the nonaligned nations calling for negotiation. President Johnson's speech on April 8 was predicated on the official American position that North Vietnam controls the Vietcong in South Vietnam and the course of the guerrilla war there. This view, enunciated in the Department of State's white paper was open to serious question. A special Japanese envoy to study the situation in Vietnam for the Government of Japan, Mr. Matsumoto, pointed out that the Vietcong is much like the French underground during World War II representing different groups in the country. "It can be said that the Vietcong is not directly connected to Communist China or the Soviet Union.

Consequently, it is not certain that the Vietcong will give up fighting because of the bombing of North Vietnam. In Vietnam I often heard it said that the Vietcong is a nationalist movement. This means the Vietcong will not give up resistance until they have achieved their objectives. Mr. Matsumoto said that no one could really define the character of the Vietcong and that even our own administration in Saigon estimates that the Communists only include 30 percent of the Vietcong. The Japanese position would seem to comport with the dynamics of revolutionary or resistance movements. Those who in fact do the fighting, live through hardship and misery, are not very quick to hand over their power to another, be it Ho Chi Minh or Mao Tse tung. Ironically, the interests of the North Vietnamese and the Vietcong further diverged once the United States undertook to bomb North Vietnam. Although the North Vietnamese were suffering in their own country the Vietcong continued to flourish. If this is true it would mean that Ho Chi Minh may find it very difficult to stop the war. There are four ways of looking at this "reality" in terms of American policy:

1. That the official U.S. position is correct; that Ho controls the Vietcong enough to stop the war;
2. That the United States has been fooled by its own ideology which insists on continuing Communist conspiracy as the way of explaining revolution or civil war movements;
3. That the United States wishes to stabilize the southeast Asia area and in due time will offer Ho Chi Minh and his group leadership in an attempt to countercheck the power of Communist China; or
4. That U.S. planners really accept the interpretation of the Japanese, knows that there is little connection between the southern rebels and North Vietnamese controlled conspiracy mask its unwillingness to settle the war.

The American rationale may be predicated on the third point; viz, that the United States wishes to counterbalance the power of Communist China by using Ho Chi Minh and the anti-Chinese feelings of the North Vietnamese to counterbalance the Chinese.

The insistence on negotiating with Ho Chi Minh to the virtual exclusion of the Vietcong appears to fly directly in the face of the stated policy of an independent South Vietnam. It would appear that it was to American advantage to negotiate or agree to negotiate with the Vietcong and Liberation Front since they would, likely (and given the emphasis on the regional character of the country) build their own political power relatively independent of North Vietnamese domination.

The President's speech which outlined the possibilities of the Mekong River Delta project while not something which could immediately yield results would have the positive effect of diverting war energies to more constructive ends. What is important in this case is not that the Mekong project would take a decade before it "bore fruit," but that it reflects a new process toward cooperation and activity in the name of man. In that sense (and although both parts of the President's speech reflected the terrible hubris of the United States) the second half of that speech should be taken as a direction in which the United States is prepared to participate not as boss but as good neighbor. That view is quite far from the views set forth in the first part of the speech which left the impression that we could only be satisfied in international affairs according to our values and principles since we did not fight for such mundane things as territory or colonies. No price it seemed was too great to pay for what we believed "right."

Not surprisingly the speech was read by the Chinese in the context of the military buildup by the United States in Vietnam, its increased raids and military titillation of the Chinese border. The North Vietnamese, while rejecting the offer of "unconditional discussions" seemed more disposed, according to East European sources, to take the President's offer seriously even to the extent of neutralizing both North and South Vietnam. Most diplomats in the East and West agreed that no negotiations or unlimited discussions could be entered into until the United States stopped bombing North Vietnam. Since the military purpose in such bombings were admittedly infinitesimal and since, as the President said in his speech, "We have no desire to devastate that which the people of North Vietnam have built with toil and sacrifice," cessation of bombings in North Vietnam would hardly be costly to the United States.

IV

Since the Second World War, American policymakers have developed America's foreign policy role as that of world's policeman. We assumed this role in Vietnam, a place where we did not begin to comprehend the complex cross-currents of politics, nationalism, personality, tradition, history, and other people's interests. To support our role as policeman our military and CIA programs in southeast Asia grew to mammoth proportions without rhyme or reason. These programs often reflected little more than the power struggles of the agencies of American bureaucracy, rather than anything which went on in Asia. A report on Vietnam and southeast Asia prepared by four Senators on the request of President Kennedy in 1963 stated:

"It should also be noted, in all frankness, that our own bureaucratic tendencies to act in uniform and enlarging patterns have resulted in an expansion of the U.S. commitment in some places to an extent which would appear to bear only the remotest relationship to what is essential, or even desirable, in terms of U.S. interests."

The United States, by the military and covert way it operated in Vietnam in the past 10 years, has nurtured strong anti-white and anti-Western feelings in southeast Asia. Whether we called it "responsibility" or empire, the facts were that the

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United States succeeded to the Japanese and French hegemony in Asia without really knowing why or with what purpose. Empires are very seldom built by design. They start almost accidentally; their dynamics and actions define what they are. Each empire has its own characteristics, although historically they all seem to involve defense of some allies, suppressing certain regimes in favor of others, and a powerful ideology. Ultimately, there are common characteristics in the lack of judgment on the part of their leaders who no longer are able to distinguish between real and chimeric interests because of the empire's octopuslike tentacles. Those tentacles, especially if they include extensive military involvement strangle the judgment of its leaders.

Relating to Vietnam militarily has camouflaged America's real interests and distorted the type of diplomacy and politics which should be employed there. The methods we have followed in Vietnam may not be without their costs in terms of our own Nation's stability and freedom of choice. Thus, when we ask the military to undertake projects which are inherently unmilitary, we are courting great danger. It is overdramatic to say that the United States will be faced with a French Organization de L'Armee Secrete (OAS) situation with our military if we substantially expand the war, and then attempt an accommodation, but such seeds are easily sown. For example, the official American policy in South Vietnam is to support a civilian government in Vietnam, whereas the rank and file military, including high-ranking American military officers in Vietnam, support the South Vietnamese military. Bad habits are learned in such wars and they may too easily be applied at home.

It is hard for American civilian leadership to learn that the military is not a machine which can be started and stopped by pressing a button. By definition of their mission, the military want to follow through to a military victory. We will find that each day that American policymakers procrastinate on a political settlement, the war will escalate upward militarily just by its own momentum. In this regard the military bureaucratic course of the war is quite instructive. The special forces and the Army were the military forces under President Kennedy who were given responsibility for the war. After the apparent failure of these forces to pacify the country, the Air Force lobbied for involvement.

Using the Gulf of Tonkin as the pretext, the Air Force sent planes to South Vietnam as a deterrent. But deterrents are vulnerable and can be easily destroyed by guerrillas as these were at Bien Hoa. Here the psychology of the paper tiger played its part. The Air Force's pride was wounded and it decided to involve itself more fully so that it could prove itself. Once this occurred, the Marines and the Navy (but less so) lobbied for an expanded role which was granted. Not wanting to be left out, the Army also wanted greater involvement. This was also granted by the White House. Finally, SAC in a nonnuclear way also wanted involvement. Paradoxically, the military may have wished for that involvement because they feared that the war would end, because the politicians would negotiate military withdrawal before they had a chance to test themselves in battle. Although that might have been their fear, objectively, because of such a massive military involvement in the war in a political sense it becomes very hard to impress our opponents of peaceful intentions, or to counter those groups in the American Government and the public who want a win in the military sense of the term.

The Vietnamese operation as a military venture is not one in which very many can take any particular pride. The bad habits

of that war have included torture, napalming, defoliation, and inability to understand what means could yield suitable ends. Although governments are, by their nature, notoriously uncritical of themselves, democracies, by their nature, have a better chance of holding their governments and the actions of the individuals in that government to account (even though personal responsibility for actions is not a very fashionable virtue in government). Too often governments, that, is men in government, are expected to operate by inverted meanings of responsibility and morality or forget about them while in government. (Indeed, one of our former Secretaries of State, Dean Acheson, gave such behavior ideological gloss in his Amherst College address in December 1964.) This sort of responsibility and morality can be seen in Vietnam. Where, as in the case of Vietnam, three out of four Americans until the middle of 1964 were not even aware that the United States was involved militarily, officials seem to have felt themselves free to allow sadistic and totalitarian methods in the name of fuzzy objectives. Such methods spread easily, and unthinkingly, in governments. It is best that they be exposed and terminated.

With the realization that neither the United States alone nor the Western Powers together can dictate a result in southeast Asia, does there remain any role which these countries can play in that area? Most certainly it is not that of policeman or white man's burden for Asia. That lesson was learned, or should have been, 10 years ago. Perhaps the moderately clever even learned it at the end of the Second World War. Nor is it likely that pacts such as SEATO, which do not comprise the great nations having real or geographical interests in southeast Asia, Japan, India, and Burma can ever mean anything. If the great powers are to exercise a role, and if there is to be a long-term settlement, it will have to be in concert with other nations; that is, through the U.N. Although the present line of the Chinese Communists and the North Vietnamese is to oppose U.N. involvement, because they fear that the Geneva and Laotian agreements would be scrapped, any new settlement would necessarily be predicated on the 1954 and 1962 agreements. The purpose of U.N. involvement would be to guarantee that the terms are kept.

While the U.N. machinery appears to the West to be unwieldy and leaves much room for improvement, the facts are that the U.N. in the southeast Asian area has done more to stabilize that region than either the SEATO arrangement or the American military intervention. For example, the U.N. was instrumental in ending the 1961 Laotian crisis whereas SEATO was unable even to agree on what the crisis was. The probability is that America's allies in SEATO would be more likely to act under U.N. direction than under SEATO auspices in southeast Asia, since SEATO, as an international or regional institution, has absolutely no moral or political force behind it. Furthermore, the nations of southeast Asia are more favorably disposed to the U.N. because of the voting power of the Afro-Asian and Latin American nations in the General Assembly than they are to pact alliances which are comprised principally of white Western powers. The prescription of action is not an easy one, for it will mean that we shall have to reconsider how the United States is to relate to the world, and to itself. No doubt there are other courses that parallel the one I outline. The policy I've drawn is illustrative as any policy must be until it is put to the hard test of negotiation and practice.

1. Recently more and more evidence has been reported in the United States about the torture and napalming of the Vietcong

and peasants by the South Vietnamese Army, with either American participation or acquiescence. This brutality and torture can only revolt those who are concerned with politics rather than sadism. We cannot control the torture of the North Vietnamese. We are responsible for what we do and for what our agents do. That is, we are responsible for our torture of prisoners and napalming of villages. In the spirit of shouldering our responsibility we must immediately put a stop to the bombings and torture now either allowed or sanctioned by the United States. That policy is shortsighted politically and foolish militarily. It has not resulted in any advantage to the United States. If a political settlement is the objective aimed at and elections are held, those South Vietnamese who supported the torture and napalming will be defeated. The only way that the South Vietnamese, whom we support and prop up, will change, is for us to change. When that happens, they may be able to retrain some favor in South Vietnam.

Although there is evidence which makes clear the historic roots of torture in Indochina as a method of politics, there is sufficient evidence to show how Western methods have updated the more "primitive" Vietnamese ways. At the very least, we should adopt and enforce the Prisoners of War (POW) and Red Cross Conventions as they apply to that war. There is another point to the sadism and torture. Bureaucracy and organization may involve itself in such things almost antiseptically. That is a dangerous trend in government and should be stopped. An independent investigation (along the lines of the Warren Commission) of the activities and directives of American personnel and policymaking in regard to the conduct of the war would do much to restore responsibility in statecraft. Such an investigation would help set standards by which the various agencies of the American Government operate internationally. (The new CIA Director could benefit greatly from such a review.)

2. Under the 1954 Geneva accords an election was to have been held in July 1956 in South and North Vietnam to determine the type of government it would have as a unified nation. A conference of the 14 powers, similar to the Laos negotiation, but now with U.N. sponsorship, should be convened (provided for in article 4, Geneva accords of 1962) to negotiate a permanent cessation of all military activities. As evidence of its good intentions, prior to the convening of the conference, the United States should stop the bombings of North Vietnam. The United States, with the other great powers, should now join in guaranteeing the borders of the area as a member of the 14 nations conference. That conference would set the outlines for a confederated state of Vietnam which would come into existence after certain agreed upon conditions were met. The International Control Commission (ICC) or another agreed-upon body would act as the investigator-enforcer. (It should be recalled that this method was adopted in the Palestine-Israeli situation and has worked well.) A political amnesty in both North and South Vietnam would be declared and all elements of the population in North and South Vietnam would be free to seek political representation by democratic means. This would be enforced by the ICC under U.N. sponsorship. North and South Vietnam would be admitted to the U.N. as separate states. Once confederation was achieved the Vietnamese would have single representation.

3. The ICC could be greatly strengthened if it received its authority from the U.N., and became a responsibility of the U.N. Its task would be to investigate complaints, act as a police force, conduct the initial elections in Vietnam and make continuous reports to the U.N. about any border difficul-

ties. Responsibility for serving on the ICC would rotate among members of the U.N. Payment for this activity should come from the great powers to the U.N. earmarked for the ICC. Further, with U.S. support, the ICC should act to negotiate out the differences between Thailand, Cambodia, Laos, and North and South Vietnam that have mounted over the past 10 years.

4. The situation in Laos will continue to deteriorate unless the United States undertakes diplomatic means to stop the war in Vietnam. To insure Laotian stability, the United States should lead in efforts which will give the ICC greater power and authority to act in the whole southeast Asian sector. The ICC should request, through U.N. good offices, troops from Burma, the Philippines, Nepal, New Zealand, Yugoslavia, and Algeria. They would police borders and serve as an inspection unit for arms control in the area. National responsibility for troops detachments would be on a rotational basis.

5. The United States, through the U.N. should offer aid to Laos, South Vietnam, North Vietnam, Cambodia, and Thailand in fashioning a common market between themselves, with a customs and payments union, emergency funds to finance special quick payoff projects (United States and U.N. files are bulging with such projects) and a long-term economic development project such as the Tennessee Valley Authority (TVA) for southeast Asia. Indeed, it could use the Special Fund as its primary instrument for some of these projects. The Mekong River project, which is a striking plan for land and water development, has united Cambodia, Laos, Thailand, and South Vietnam in this development activity. It is even said by those involved in the project that the Pathet Lao support the Mekong Delta project and that the North Vietnamese also would if it were extended into their area.

Correctively, a "planning bank" whose directors would be Cambodia, North Vietnam, Laos, Thailand, South Vietnam, the United States, France, Great Britain, and the Soviet Union, could direct the expenditure and planning of short-term projects in South and North Vietnam, and the Mekong project in southeast Asia. The planning bank could be funded by these powers under authority of the United Nations using the Economic Commission for Asia in the Far East (ECAFE) as its parent. The organizational structure of the planning bank would allow for inclusion of both donors and recipients as board directors. The People's Republic of China would be invited to join in one of these capacities.

6. The United States should now compensate for the bombings of Cambodian territory, the destruction of their villages, of total innocents, and of their land.

VI

The North Vietnamese are anxious for trade with the South. Except for food which they received from the Russians in 1955, the North Vietnamese would have continued the war in 1955 to obtain rice. They will do so in the future unless they are able to obtain rice from some source. The resumption of trade and the normalization of relations with North Vietnam is a small price to pay for stabilizing the situation in the Indochinese area. Like South Vietnam, North Vietnam has been under a crushing military and economic burden. Its leadership has been fighting for 25 years and is concerned that North Vietnam will lose everything in a war that could spread to their territory. Again, the North Vietnamese are concerned to keep control of their country from the Chinese and the Soviet Union. This can only be accomplished in the context of peace. In a widened military action the Chinese would move a large military force into North Vietnam.

The North Vietnamese position as supported by the Chinese and the Russians has been reasonably consistent since the Geneva Conference of 1954. Their demands flow from the Geneva accords themselves. As I have stated, on February 4, 1955, they proposed restoring normal road, rail, sea, air, and postal relations between the two zones, as was promulgated in the Geneva accords and general elections. The problem with the Geneva accords was that no nation which felt any responsibility for stability in southeast Asia cared to guarantee the agreements of that Conference. France was in no position to carry out for the whole of Vietnam a guarantee as enunciated in the accords, especially in the face of American objections. If a Geneva conference were held along the lines of the 1954 Conference with the difference being that the United States would join and guarantee the results, the probability is that Vietnam would maintain—or attain—an existence which would be independent of Communist China.

Barring the inability of the United States to control its appetite for military involvement, there is a reason for some cautious optimism. There are two strong political currents in southeast Asia. One is nationalism and the other is fear of Chinese domination. The direction of North Vietnamese and any future South Vietnamese leadership, assuming it is to have any sort of indigenous mass support, will be to achieve national political identity for their nations. This means that the local political and military leadership will work to lessen the influence of the great powers (United States, France, China, and the Soviet Union) in southeast Asia. They are aware that they cannot get very far by having outside troops prop up their regime or by being wholly dependent upon outside forces politically, diplomatically, or economically.

No doubt this attitude will cause the great powers some consternation, since historically they have used the region of southeast Asia as a pawn in their game. However, that age of international politics is over. Will Communist China abide by that view? There is no question that U.S. relations with China will soon enter a new stage. To no little extent what the United States does will drastically affect Chinese activity. If the United States helps in fashioning the political concerns of southeast Asia on real issues: water, food, and electric power, we will be in a better position of blunting Chinese power because the southeast Asian nations will have a reason for being independent. If we make it possible for China to participate in such projects peacefully we will have accomplished much in recognizing the legitimate interests of 650 million Chinese, and will have discouraged both their—and our—unreal interests. Settling the Vietnamese war can be used as an opening wedge for improving relations with the Communist Chinese in this next period of international affairs. The risks of that policy for the United States are incomparably less than a holy war with China; a war which can only result either in its nuclear demolition or a prolonged land war which the United States would probably lose on China's mainland.

The political outlines of action become clear:

(a) Investigate the conduct of the war as formulated and carried out by the United States and adopt the POW and Red Cross Conventions as it applies to the war;

(b) Convene a 14-nation conference under the aegis of the U.N. to arrange a cease-fire;

(c) Arrange for the guarantee of the borders of southeast Asia countries through the 14-nation conference;

(d) Allow the Vietnamese to work for a confederated North and South Vietnam, but admit them separately to the U.N. Whether

the people of North and South Vietnam should have one government and one political system is their affair, not ours.

(e) Strengthen the ICC politically by making it responsible to the United States and militarily by fashioning a police force comprised of rotating detachments from nations in the U.N.—Burma, the Philippines, and New Zealand;

(f) Reinstitute the customs and payments union between the nations of the area and allow trade between North and South Vietnam;

(g) Compensate Cambodia for incursions on its people and property;

(h) Develop a planning bank drawn in such a manner as to provide for the inclusion of Communist China, involve the U.N. Special Fund and ECAFE as the instruments for short- and long-term economic aid to Vietnam and neighboring states.

St. Augustine lived his life in a debauched way before his conversion. If debauchery is a necessary prerequisite to redemption, then the situation in Vietnam is ready for the next step. We may be sure that no policy a government follows is holy. However, at least this policy would be in the American national interest.

(Mr. FISHER asked and was given permission to extend his remarks at this point in the Record.)

[Mr. FISHER'S remarks will appear hereafter in the Appendix.]

MR. FOLEY OF THE LOS ANGELES TIMES DOES A SUPERIOR JOB OF REPORTING ON A SUBJECT THAT SHOULD BE OF INTEREST TO EVERY AMERICAN: TWO PROFESSIONAL ASSISTANTS FOR EACH MEMBER OF THE HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES

(Mr. PATMAN asked and was given permission to extend his remarks at this point in the Record and to include extraneous matter.)

Mr. PATMAN. Mr. Speaker, Thomas J. Foley, of the Washington Bureau of the Los Angeles Times, has written a piece about the need for more adequate staffing by the Congress of the United States. I advocate each House Member being provided with two professional assistants.

Recently I made a speech on the subject and suggested that every Representative have two additional specialized employees: First, a lawyer qualified to evaluate proposed legislation; and second, an economist equipped to weigh the manifold problems of the American economy with all of their social ramifications.

I have read every word of Mr. Foley's piece and can take issue with none of it. In the speech I delivered on the subject, I stated that it would be necessary to have a fourth office building in order to accommodate all the Representatives with their new employees. Howls went up from one end of the country to the other about another House Office Building. The reasons I gave for needing such an office building, to keep pace with the growth of each Congressman's workload and the growth of the Nation, were lost in the catcalls. It took a good newsman like Mr. Foley, with a sense of jour-

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came an integral and creative force in its culture.

The people of Poland have, since the days of Jamestown and through the centuries of events to the present, furnished the bone and sinew of American growth. At Jamestown Poles cheered and supported John Smith. During the Civil War her soldiers fought on the side of the Union while her daughters nursed our soldiers on the battlefield. Throughout the years these sturdy pioneers of freedom have been a source of strength to the country of their adoption. Today, Polish Americans have set their purpose to the ultimate liberation of their homeland. In their hopes and in the attainment of their prayers all Americans join.

Polish Constitution Day

SPEECH
OF

HON. JAMES M. HANLEY

OF NEW YORK

IN THE HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES

Monday, May 3, 1965

Mr. HANLEY. Mr. Speaker, it is my great pleasure to commend the people of Poland and their American brothers on the anniversary of the Polish Constitution signed on May 3, 1791.

The country of Poland had been severed by Russia, Prussia, and Austria and after that partitioning, Polish leaders felt a sense of urgency to find a means to prevent future national calamities. They needed a format for the Government designed to unite and strengthen their country.

To this end, in 1788, a committee of the National Assembly, the Diet, was formulated to draw up a constitution to improve the Government. This commissioned body was comprised of liberal, freedom-seeking, patriotic men. Discontentment among the tired and disgusted masses in monarchical Poland was great. This state acted as a catalyst; thus 3 years later, a constitution was signed.

This first Democratic document in Eastern Europe, signed on May 3, 1791, reduced the arbitrary powers of the King by channeling his authority through a council. The powers of the upper Chamber of the Assembly were reduced and those of the popular-elected lower Chamber were liberalized and fortified. The peasantry were freed and placed for the first time under the protection of the law. Separation of the middle and lower classes from the nobility was minimized. The authority of the landlords over the peasantry was reduced. Equally as important, the liberum veto whereby one Member of the Diet could veto any measure was abolished thus assuring passage of more legislation. This constitution also created the first type of cabinet government. Perhaps one of the most important provisions was freedom of religion, conscience, and speech. Thus, Poland became the pioneer of democracy in Europe by proclaiming the sovereignty of her people.

Old Sanborn Field

EXTENSION OF REMARKS

OF

HON. RICHARD (DICK) ICHORD

OF MISSOURI

IN THE HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES

Wednesday, May 5, 1965

Mr. ICHORD. Mr. Speaker, the world is full of surprises, to be sure, but the report of a scientific surprise which reached me recently is worthy of calling to the attention of this body. For background information may I point out that the ensuing article, entitled "Old Sanborn Field," was written by one of my constituents, Clyde H. Duncan, associate agricultural editor of the College of Agriculture, University of Missouri. The article was contained in a publication, *Harvest—An Anthology of Farm Writings*, by Wheeler McMillen, formerly editor of *Farm Journal*. Mr. Wheeler, it is reported to me, decided to include Old Sanborn Field in his collection because "this story about Old Sanborn Field is priceless and must be included in my anthology. It cannot be lost to posterity."

Old Sanborn Field, located on the campus of the University of Missouri, is considered one of the most important experimental fields, and because of the scientific surprise the 8-acre plot has special significance.

I commend the article to the Members of the House of Representatives:

OLD SANBORN FIELD

(By Clyde H. Duncan)

The little professor through the years, with soil auger in hand and with students following behind him at a dogtrot, had almost worn a path from his classrooms in Waters and Mumford Halls to "Old Sanborn," the small 8-acre experimental field within this city's (Columbia, Mo.) boundaries.

His actions were by no means unusual in this placid community long accustomed to professors, where education is the common currency. If he had been carrying a blunderbuss instead of the soil auger, it would hardly have caused an eyebrow to raise.

Now it was 1945 and "Bill" Albrecht, as farmers and fertilizer folks knew him and not as "the professor," was standing in this same old field. His sleeves were rolled up, his collar wilted down under the rays of an August sun, hot enough, he says now, to fry a pan of catfish. He was taking one more soil sample but now there were no students with their staccato firing of questions. He had more time for meditation and that's just what the task in hand required. He was on a special mission, one of his many very special missions.

Presently, he came to plot 23. He stopped suddenly, gave it a cursory survey. He could recite its history backwards and forwards, every year of its existence since 1888, or since J. W. Sanborn, the stormy, crotchety dean, had established this land as rotation field. During all these 57 years this plot had been unfertilized, Albrecht knew, and had constantly been cropped to timothy alone.

He had a hunch, and perhaps even a good scientific reason, for taking a sample from this particular area. He wanted it for a friend who was interested in the new wonder drug research now dally making the front pages. This friend had written him tersely, "Please send me a good representative sample of Sanborn Field. I'm playing a hunch that the old field is loaded with fungus." Maybe

those weren't his exact words but they are close enough.

So, from plot 23, Dr. William A. Albrecht, then chairman of the Department of Soils of the University of Missouri, carefully shoveled up a sample of good earth which, through all the long years dating back well into the last century, had known no other crop but mule forage. Many thoughts, as they always did, rushed through Albrecht's scientific brain as he walked back down College Avenue with his soil sample to Mumford Hall and the lab. There, he was a familiar figure with crucible, test tube, or retort in hand, always talking fast and gesturing faster to some freshman student about how to concentrate on his studies, or to some doctoral candidate on such subjects as colloidal investigations.

Now, back in his lab on this August day, 1945, less important things, such as conferences with professors and meetings with fertilizer executives, could all wait. He had something more important to do. He had this package of soil to mail, without delay, to his oldtime colleague and former University of Missouri faculty friend, Dr. Benjamin M. Duggar, the botanist.

"What has Albrecht sent me this time?" Duggar no doubt said on receiving this bit of Missouri crust. "He's probably outdone himself this time."

The botanist was to find that his own words were truly prophetic, and that Albrecht had outdone himself and all other men up to that time for the laboratory soon was to reveal that the sample from plot 23, Sanborn Field, University of Missouri, contained the first golden mold from which aureomycin was obtained. Thus, this was the beginning, the starting point, of the now world-renowned antibiotic similar to penicillin.

It would be awhile before all the story of this day's events would be completely written, if ever, Duggar and Albrecht knew. But one thing they did know, as scientists, that soon the fruits of this day's labors would be put to work saving millions from untimely deaths. They know, too, or strongly suspected, that it would prove the arch enemy of certain death-dealing viruses as well as both gram-positive and gram-negative bacteria.

One now can easily visualize Dr. Duggar looking a bit bewildered after this famous discovery, serving as he was then as consultant in mycological fungus research and production for American Cyanamid's Lederle Laboratories. One can almost hear him saying, "Albrecht has more wizardry and magic than Houdini. Imagine, of all the places he might have spaded the soil for a sample, he picks just the right one that happened to be loaded with aureomycin."

Dr. Duggar, no doubt, was awed by this unusual discovery. It is doubtful, though, if it surprised the professor, who had become accustomed to seeing Sanborn Field produce the out-of-the-way and the unusual so much so as to establish for it a peculiar niche in the literature of agriculture. Rebellike, this tiny field seemed never to stick to the script.

Dr. Albrecht, as a director of all of the Sanborn Field research, had seen these same acres produce face-reddening facts. For instance, he knew that back when everyone was talking and preaching crop rotations evidence from Sanborn Field had proven that such practices under certain conditions could not be beneficial but actually very harmful. This man of classroom and laboratory, a born teacher, knew, too, that contrary to early admonitions that legumes left the soil better than they found it, wasn't always true. Legumes, overdone could, instead of leaving the soil with an abundance of stored nitrogen, leave it as impoverished as a sharecropper's land following a lifetime of following a one-crop system. Sanborn Field also had taught the research men that fertilizers applied without rhyme or reason could be almost as bad as no fertilizer at all.

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Albrecht knew these things, because he knew Sanborn Field, those few little acres that the unimaginative had once tried to turn into a parking lot, but which were capable of producing more scientific surprises than a clown in a circus. It was this knowledge which mothered a remark by him when the soil sample that had produced the then newest of the wonder drugs was presented in special ceremonies at the Smithsonian Institution on October 15, 1958.

He declared at that time, his friends say, that it was very doubtful if any other plot of land, comparable in size on the face of the earth, has produced as much genuine knowledge and wisdom for humanity's use in combating physical suffering and hunger as have the hallowed acres of Sanborn Field.

The Nonlethal Gas Issue

EXTENSION OF REMARKS

OF

HON. CRAIG HOSMER

OF CALIFORNIA

IN THE HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES

Wednesday, May 5, 1965

Mr. HOSMER. Mr. Speaker, the following essay, which makes a lot of sense, is found in the American Security Council's Washington report for May 3, and was authored by Dr. Stefan Possony of the Hoover Institution on War, Revolution, and Peace:

THE HUMANIZATION OF WAR

(By Stefan Possony)

The utilization in the Vietnamese war of nonlethal gases may turn out to be a significant milestone in the history of armed conflict. According to Washington, nonlethal gases were made available by the United States to Vietnam and were used by Vietnamese troops upon a decision by the Vietnamese command. Secretary Rusk stated that the nonlethal gas employed belongs to the class of tear gases. Less authoritative Washington sources stated that the gas causes attacks of nausea and diarrhea lasting a few hours. This gas supposedly can be bought on the open market and is normally employed for riot control.

Whatever the nature of the gas itself, it seems doubtful, under the circumstances, that company-grade commanders were authorized to order the use of gas of any kind as they would order rifle or machinegun fire.

It seems, rather, that we should congratulate President Johnson and Secretary McNamara on a decision which, in one way or the other, they must have made deliberately and which, potentially, could be one of the most humanitarian decisions of all times. I hope that they will have the courage of their own convictions and will not give in to the anti-American and antigas propaganda barrage.

Thus far, American leaders have handled the propaganda attack by declaring that the gas would continue to be used whenever required, namely in riotlike circumstances. Yet, it would be far better if the United States were to decide to employ nonlethal gas systematically and on a large scale as one of our primary means of bringing the Vietnamese war to a close.

What is the background for opposition to chemical weapons?

In 1915, the Germans who were unable to break the British and French lines by the traditional means of artillery, infantry, and cavalry, resorted to gas attacks. The chemical weapon came as a complete surprise to the Allies. Actually, the initial effectiveness

of gas also surprised the German general staff which originally was committed merely to the experimental use of the weapon. Because the gases were deadly, and because there was no defense, nor a capability for retaliation, the Allies feared that the Germans had achieved technological superiority. In their desperation, Paris and London unleashed a furious propaganda campaign branding the employment of poison gas as barbarous and inhuman. The American press took up the theme and soon the world found itself in a paroxysm of moral protest.

The Germans remained undeterred. But since they had only rudimentary gas warfare capabilities and had not thought through their tactics, they were unable to win any decisive victories. Within a year, just by the time the Germans were in a position to make really effective use of the weapon, the British and French had developed adequate defenses and were using chemical ammunitions of their own. From then on gas shells belonged in the standard arsenal. This should have ended the propaganda excitement, but opposition to gas warfare continued unabated and gradually grew stronger.

Granted that there is a different psychological reaction to gas than to lead and steel, criticism on humane grounds still was unjustified because chemical ammunition allowed the attainment of military objectives by inflicting only a quarter of the fatalities that were caused by high explosive shells. Granted also that the effects of gas on human skins, respiratory organs and mucous membranes often lingered and that some indirect effects (for example on kidneys) could last for decades, it was nevertheless true that most gas casualties recovered completely, that gas crippled only small numbers (mostly in the form of blindness), and that shrapnel was an immeasurably more deadly killer than gas. The fact is that the lethality of the gas shell was far less than that of the high explosive shell. The foremost utility of gas, therefore, was not that it inflicted casualties but that it reduced the opponent's tactical flexibility and mobility and that it affected the morale and psychology of hostile troops.

To give one concrete example of survival: Adolf Hitler was heavily gassed by the end of World War I. To the disadvantage of all other survivors of that conflict he was promptly cured and left the hospital to start a political career. For another 27 years, Hitler was able to operate at a high level of effectiveness; he died by suicide, not as a result of poison gas.

The eagerness with which, after World War I, Britain and France signed the Geneva Convention outlawing gas warfare was due to the backfire of their own propaganda. If humanitarianism really had been used as a standard of judgment, high explosive weapons should have been outlawed instead of chemical munitions. The United States, incidentally, did not become a signatory to the Geneva Convention; nor did the U.S.S.R.

Whether or not it would have been advantageous during World War II, for one or the other side, to resort to gas warfare remains an open question. The military knew all about the poor lethality of the weapon on the battlefield. Since there were adequate defenses at least against gases affecting the lungs and eyes, none of the high commands thought it worthwhile to press the point. Toward the end of the war, the Germans invented the so-called nerve gases which are believed to be far more deadly than earlier types; but by then they had no suitable means of delivery and the allies possessed more than adequate means of retaliation. Thus, there was no obvious overriding advantage to gas warfare in the European theater.

By contrast, if chemical weapons had been used in the Pacific against Japanese held islands—which had to be seized through am-

phibious assault at a high cost in American lives—U.S. casualties could have been kept to a minimum. It is to be presumed that the utilization even of lethal gases may have permitted large numbers of Japanese soldiers to survive. If nonlethal gases had been used, the casualty rates very well may have been reduced drastically on both sides. The use of nonlethal gases, therefore, was indicated for humane, and also for many solid military reasons. Unfortunately, fear of public opinion precluded utilization of the chemical capability and caused thousands of Americans and Japanese to die.

No one in his right mind ever has criticized the pacifist desire to abolish war. But wars continue to occur and the United States continues to be involved. Furthermore, we have now entered a period when it is most likely that an increasing number of so-called pacification missions will have to be executed in order to stop bloodshed and the indiscriminate slaughter of civilians. Why, in any of the operations in which American and U.N. forces will be engaged, should fatalities be inflicted which can be avoided? In fighting guerrillas American forces often will be meeting enemy soldiers who are opposed to communism, who are fundamentally friendly to the democratic cause, and whose death is not at all in our interest. On the contrary, our tactical and political interests would be served best if those potentially friendly soldiers were captured and converted.

As a general principle, if a military objective can be attained through the employment of weapons that inflict a minimum rather than a maximum number of fatalities, it would be the preferred moral and humane course of action to fight with the more benign arms. The employment of nonlethal weapons would be particularly wise if such a choice would yield desirable political byproducts.

The attitude of self-styled pacifists and ritualistic critics of gas warfare is logically and morally indefensible and can be explained only by the example of Pavlov's dog who reacts to the sound of a bell by salivating regardless of whether food is offered or not. The so-called humanitarians are reacting to the word "gas" but not to the reality which is symbolized by this abstraction. Opposing nonlethal gas on the grounds that any gas is objectionable is like opposing a protective serum that produces temporary discomfort on the grounds that it is a killing poison.

In the present concrete case, the United States has no particular reason to assume that the North Vietnamese population is supporting the Communist regime enthusiastically. The Vietcong, undoubtedly, include well indoctrinated and disciplined Communists but it is unlikely that most Vietcong soldiers are lastingly hostile; quite a few of them probably are serving against their will. Under the circumstances, while we must make every effort to prevent the enemy from hurting our ally or prolonging the conflict, we have no interest whatever in killing North Vietnamese soldiers or civilians. Our present interest is to break up the Vietcong, to deprive them of their resources, to lessen their will to fight, to halt the flow of their supplies, and to stop the guerrilla offensive.

The employment of nonlethal gases imposes upon us the duty to devote sophisticated attention to the psychological aspects of our strategy. The unfortunate fact is that, as so often before, we have once again demonstrated that our technological capabilities exceed our psychological talents. Did we again follow our routine of forgetting about propaganda? Or did we entrust the planning and execution of psychological operations to unqualified personnel? Or did the advice of qualified personnel go unheeded? On the basis of considerable personal experience, I

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can assure our defense officials that psychological operations can be highly cost effective by themselves and are well suited to enhance the cost effectiveness of all hardware weapons.

Instead of being apologetic about our use of temporary incapacitators, the United States should adopt the policy of employing nonlethal weapons of all kinds whenever this is militarily opportune. We must insure that this American policy will be understood by our enemies. The time has come when the United States should take long delayed initiatives to enlarge our capability of waging war with a whole spectrum of nonlethal weapons. Washington should commit itself to develop modern technology for the increasing humanization of armed conflict and for the downward escalation of violence.

Let those who oppose nonlethal weapons state unequivocally that they prefer to kill people instead of keeping them alive. And let the United States make the case for nonlethal warfare honestly, clearly, and openly before the entire world. We could hardly have a better case.

"Jibaro" With a Fresh Approach**EXTENSION OF REMARKS**

OF

HON. MORRIS K. UDALL

OF ARIZONA

IN THE HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES

Wednesday, May 5, 1965

Mr. UDALL. Mr. Speaker, one of the brightest, most hopeful and sparkling personalities in the freshman corps of the 89th Congress is our colleague, SANTIAGO POLANCO-ABREU, the new Resident Commissioner of Puerto Rico. In the brief span of the first 100 days of the new Congress, the gentleman from Puerto Rico [Mr. POLANCO-ABREU] has made the acquaintance of most of his fellow Members, and I can say that he has impressed us with his vigor and ability. Although he is young in age, he has already achieved the wisdom and ability of a statesman, and I predict that there are great things in store for our colleague, whom we have come to know as "CHAGUIN."

When I was in Puerto Rico recently, there appeared in the April 18 issue of the San Juan Star—the only English-language newspaper in the island—a Sunday feature reviewing our colleague's first 100 days in Congress. It was entitled "A 'Jibaro' With a Fresh Approach." I learned that a "jibaro" in Puerto Rico is a person from the rural countryside. The article is, I think, a fine characterization of our distinguished colleague, and I am sure that our fellow Members will be interested in reading it.

Mr. Speaker, without objection, the article follows:

POLANCO'S FIRST 100 DAYS—A JIBARO WITH A FRESH APPROACH

(By Walter S. Priest)

("As POLANCO himself once observed to a newsman, the job of nonvoting Resident Commissioner, powerless as it seems, is anything the incumbent wants to make it. With the decentralization of power which Muñoz himself ordered, the Resident Commissioner's job has assumed a new place in the political firmament.")

WASHINGTON.—For reasons long lost to American political mythology, the first 100

days of a new President are highly significant. During this brief period, the Chief Executive supposedly proposes his program, learns who his friends and enemies in Congress are, and stamps his personality on his administration forevermore.

The first 100 days of a freshmen Member of the House of Representatives are unlikely to be as earthshaking. Chances are they pass quickly in a confusion of endless marble hallways, instructions from party chiefs and wrong telephone numbers before the Member sinks into legislative limbo as the lowest ranking member on a committee he didn't want anyway.

Such was not the fate of a self-styled jibaro from Puerto Rico, however. When SANTIAGO POLANCO-ABREU's first 100 days ended on April 14, Puerto Rico's new Resident Commissioner was acting more like a President than a junior lawmaker. Already, the impeccably dressed man with the firm handshake and the warm smile of the practiced politician has been adding new dimensions to an office which has languished in the shadows for 20 years.

Close friends confide the 44-year-old attorney was less than overjoyed when the Popular Democratic Party, reportedly acting at the urging of doña Igés de Muñoz Marín, tapped POLANCO to succeed retiring Resident Commissioner Dr. Antonio Fernós-Isern. After all, largely by his own efforts he had earned the powerful post of Commonwealth House speaker following the death of Ernesto Ramos Antonini, former Gov. Luis Muñoz-Marín's decision to step aside left several inviting vacuums of power in both party and government. POLANCO, a trusted troubleshooter for Muñoz in the Dominican crisis of 1963, was also identified with the rising young expansionist wing of the Popular Democratic Party. In short, Puerto Rico was a warm and friendly place. Washington was cold and remote, and the complexities of the Federal establishment a little forbidding, especially to a jibaro even if you pay him \$30,000 a year.

The very things, however, that made life in Puerto Rico so inviting were today becoming important determinants in shaping POLANCO's position. As POLANCO himself once observed to a newsman, the job of a nonvoting Resident Commissioner, powerless as it seems, is anything the incumbent wants to make it. Under Muñoz' highly centralized administration the scope was severely limited. Muñoz was his own Governor, Ambassador, Resident Commissioner, and political plumber rolled into one. With the decentralization of power which Muñoz himself ordered, the Resident Commissioner's job has assumed a new place in the political firmament. While POLANCO would be the last to admit it, he is building the office into a steppingstone to the Governorship. This would be true whether he liked the idea or not. The Popular Democratic Party today lacks the manpower in its younger echelons who combine the insight into Federal and Commonwealth affairs of a Muñoz. In 4 or 8 years the exception will be POLANCO.

Few of these hindsight observations were running through the minds of newsmen whom POLANCO invited to a first informal chat over cocktails at Washington's Madison Hotel early last January. For both sides it was a chance to measure one another's character. As the evening wore on, it became plain POLANCO was interviewing the newsmen. It was equally clear to them that here was a Resident Commissioner who enjoyed the undefinable essence of politics whether practiced in Washington or San Juan, a man who enjoyed debate, new concepts and approaches. If during the discussion veterans of the Puerto Rican beat were prone to smile a bit at his insistence he would stomp the country to acquaint Americans with Puerto Rico, they erred badly. They were hearing the first tentative expressions of what has

become the keystone of POLANCO's policy as Resident Commissioner and perhaps the most crucial aspect of United States-Puerto Rican relations for the next decade.

As a practical matter, when he completes his trip to California and Washington States later this summer he will have traveled some 8,000 miles on behalf of a mission of awesome difficulty. From a political point of view, the "mission" is no less than establishing for Puerto Rico an importance in "domestic" U.S. affairs equal to its well-known role in "foreign policy." Logic insists the two are inseparable. But logic has never been a dictator in Washington.

POLANCO's burden was thrust upon him by the kind of ironic situation only Puerto Rico seems able to produce. Basking for nearly a decade in the warmth of mainland public relations too successful in chanting the "miracle" of Commonwealth progress, "bootstrapping," and "showcase" imagery, Puerto Rico committed the most unpardonable sin in Washington politics. It became a bore.

The biggest bore of all was its preoccupation with "status." The infinite legalisms, the "culture" and "identity" debates cause the mind to boggle and the eye to go glassy. As one member of the House Interior and Insular Affairs Committee once put it: "You're eating regularly, aren't you? So what's the problem?"

POLANCO has plunged in to show that eating regularly is only one facet of the Puerto Rican condition. But first a common ground for discussion must be found. Puerto Ricans are so far ahead of Americans in their thinking on socioeconomic problems of status, they don't even inhabit the same planet.

It is this search for a common denominator that has led POLANCO to transform the office of Resident Commissioner into what is a center for a communication program. A part of the effort showed recently in a series of press conferences with newsmen representing various regional papers. They were offered State by State statistics on the jobs generated by Puerto Rican purchases in various U.S. markets. But this is only a part of the effort.

Far more important is POLANCO's desire to transform himself and his office into honest broker for all political persuasions on Puerto Rican questions. This has involved thrusting himself and Puerto Rico into mainland issues. In his maiden statement to the House, which came during debate on the education bill, POLANCO made it clear he would speak out on national questions. "I am not," he later added, "simply going to talk and talk. They do not want to hear the same fellow every day."

"My basic aim is to interest Members of Congress in Puerto Rico; to create a climate in which they will have confidence in my opinion about Puerto Rico; to let them know the importance of the special political relations between Puerto Rico and the United States in relation to the entire hemisphere. "Perhaps I can pave the way for the time the Status Study Commission makes its report."

To the effort he calls opening the door psychologically POLANCO applies his talents as a listener and politician's intuitive grasp of the possible. Like himself, he finds, the average Congressman must concentrate on his district almost to the exclusion of everything else.

If this tends to insulate the average lawmaker's mind, the alternative is even more unprofitable. Defeat at the polls. Therefore POLANCO takes Puerto Rico's case to the lawmaker, scheduling at least 5 meetings a week with various Members, 200 during the session, and traveling with them if they invite him to their districts.

Although he has some personal doubt the Resident Commissioner should sit automat-

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ically on the House Interior, Agriculture, and Armed Services Committees to the exclusion of others, he attends meetings regularly. The fact they may have no legislation involving Puerto Rico does not matter. He goes.

"If you're interested in my problems, I'll be interested in yours," POLANCO observes.

POLANCO's ability to mix with the Washington whirl often obscures the deeply introspective side of his nature. In any moment his face can change from that of the convivial politician to a man tortured by self-doubt. The frown that follows connotes great spiritual struggles in progress in this lawyer's neatly compartmented mind. His tendency is to worry a problem into submission; if one approach seems wrong, try another.

Although he spans two generations in Commonwealth politics, POLANCO hates to be classified ideologically. However, he does subscribe to the "dynamic" concept of Commonwealth. "You have to consider the historical moment of 1940 and 24 years later. Puerto Rico is different because, after all, the world is different too."

"This special relationship, it should have a dynamic of its own. The best way to classify me is that I want a more perfect compact to insure a more perfect union with the United States."

Once a Stacom report is in, he thinks Puerto Ricans will go to a plebiscite but doubts Congress would bind itself in advance to any particular commission finding. What would be valuable, he believes, is for the commission to issue "a profound intellectual statement that relations are legitimate from the constitutional point of view. That would be a good step now."

His introspective side has led him into extensive private research on the history of U.S. political institutions, including Congress, which he now admits he understands better than he did as Commonwealth house speaker. The results show in the speeches rattling out of his office since early February.

He possesses the talent of targeting his audiences to perfection. For the highbrow staff of the Brookings Institution or Institute of Puerto Rico in New York, which voted him its Citizen-of-the-Year Award, he talks about "cultural pluralism." For the Society for International Development (SID) or the Pan American Liaison Committee of Women's Organizations, he stresses economic issues.

He has lectured New York's Puerto Ricans over the radio on the administration's civil rights bill and encouraged a group of 150 Puerto Rico-bound youths in Wooster, Ohio, to unbridle their imaginations and "see for themselves."

In every case listeners are led to break new intellectual ground without casting completely loose from their familiar thought patterns or encountering confusing or radical ideas. The adroit interweaving of fact and concept has already won editorial praise in several areas and in Congress.

At the same time, POLANCO will not duck a fight for diplomacy's sake. When Columnist Marguerite Higgins penned a series of acid columns on "communism" in Puerto Rico, POLANCO fired back promptly. Editors of nearly every paper publishing the articles received a polite but firm letter setting the record straight.

Transformation in the Resident Commissioner's policies is reflected in the trappings of office as well. Last week, painters and sanders directed by POLANCO's charming wife, Viola Orsini, were stripping the gloomy magnificence from his quarters above the office of Puerto Rico at 2210 R Street. Pearl white walls and varnished natural wood floors now sparkle in the living room. POLANCO's intention is to turn his home into a center for Puerto Rican life in Washington, a truly

radical departure from his predecessor. But it must have caught on. For the first time in anyone's memory Luis Muñoz-Marín was staying in the Resident Commissioner's quarters and apparently enjoying it despite the flying plaster. To POLANCO's delight he can now talk politics on into the night with a man he greatly admires.

POLANCO frankly confesses the intense social life of official Washington "is just too much for me." Work days, which include Saturdays, find him up at 7:15 a.m., reading the Washington Post and New York Times. After a quick breakfast he descends to his first-floor office and works until 9 a.m., when he leaves for his cramped congressional quarters in the Old House Office Building. If meetings of his committees are scheduled for the morning he usually attends and then walks over to the House chamber to hear the debates. Afternoons, starting at 3 p.m., are devoted to callers and conferences. At around 6 p.m., when most offices close, he starts dictating letters and reading up on the next day's work until around 7 p.m. Chances are the unavoidable social entanglement presents itself about that time and that means home for dinner again around 8:30 p.m. About Washington social life, Mrs. Polanco has little to say except that it's part of the business.

Shortly after his arrival, POLANCO boldly announced plans for redecorating his quarters included hanging a genuine Puerto Rican hammock in a shaded nook.

"It will look like I'm sleeping but I'll really be thinking," he quipped. He could have saved the defensive distinctions and even the trouble of hanging his hammock. By the look of his appointment book he won't use it until next year anyway. Such is life for a man with a "mission."

time for the U.S. Department of State to engage in a pact with Israel to conclude a mutual security pact declaring Israel as our sole, true friend and responsible and reliable ally in the Middle East. We should supply Israel with defense weapons she needs to meet the aggression of Saudi Arabia and Nasser's anti-Israel allies.

Successful Economic Policy: A Three-Way Partnership Between Business, Labor, and Government

EXTENSION OF REMARKS OF

HON. W. PAT JENNINGS

OF VIRGINIA

IN THE HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES

Wednesday, May 5, 1965

Mr. JENNINGS. Mr. Speaker, Secretary of the Treasury Henry H. Fowler, in his first major speech as Secretary, recently addressed the annual convention of the American Society of Newspaper Editors. Secretary Fowler cited the unparalleled economic growth and prosperity experienced by this country during the past 4 years. He points out realistic fiscal policies. And he cites the spirit of cooperation between business, labor, and Government, which has prevailed during the Kennedy administration and the administration of President Johnson as being responsible for our success.

I deem the remarks of Secretary Fowler, a native Virginian and a highly experienced Government administrator, to be of great importance to all Americans and of special interest to the Congress. I, therefore, include the full text of Secretary Fowler's speech:

REMARKS BY THE HONORABLE HENRY H. FOWLER, SECRETARY OF THE TREASURY, BEFORE THE ANNUAL CONVENTION OF THE AMERICAN SOCIETY OF NEWSPAPER EDITORS

I am particularly happy to make this, my first fulfilled speech as Secretary of the Treasury before a group that plays so vital a role in informing the American public about the complex and critical issues that confront our Nation.

As I do so I am conscious that I observe a precedent set 4 years ago when my distinguished predecessor and good friend, Douglas Dillon, made his maiden economic address as Secretary of the Treasury before this very same group.

In that address, he set forth a twofold program to bring us closer to our economic goals: First, a complete overhaul of our tax system to augment incentives, initiative, and effort in the private sector of our economy, and second, an overall monetary approach to assure the ample availability of long-term credit so essential to domestic growth while maintaining short-term rates at levels high enough to prevent any excessive outflow of dollars abroad. These policies, he declared, would lead us—and I quote, "to a period of growth and prosperity during the sixties' such as this Nation has never known."

Next month, the economic expansion that began in February of 1961 will become the longest in the entire history of our Nation—except for the expansion that included World War II. There could be no better testimony to the success of our economic policies over the past 4 years.

Sweeney Calls for an End of U.S. Policy of Appeasing Nasser

EXTENSION OF REMARKS OF

HON. ROBERT E. SWEENEY

OF OHIO

IN THE HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES

Wednesday, May 5, 1965

Mr. SWEENEY. Mr. Speaker, as Congressman at Large from the State of Ohio, I today call upon the U.S. Department of State to end a policy of appeasing Nasser and the Arab States in their continuing efforts to rob the Republic of Israel by diverting the headwaters of the Jordan River.

The world has stood in admiration of the Republic of Israel and her creative achievements since her conception. Centuries of neglect and waste resulted in the vast creation of desert lands; and, when Israel came into being, she made these lands begin to bloom again by the wise use of her water resources.

The Arabs, now, are attempting to dry out Israel and turn the land back to desert. No American foreign policy expert should support this Nasser-conceived plot to destroy this thriving civilization, from which humanity derives so much benefit.

I predict violence will flair up at any time concerning the Nasser move to deprive Israel of water.

As an American legislator, I cannot remain silent in the face of Arab provocation endangering peace. Now is the

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subject matter. If the conciliation group cannot reach agreement at the same session of the Conference or Board, it reports to the next session of the Conference or Board whichever comes first.

If the conciliation group has reached agreement, the agreed resolution can be voted. If it has not, a decision can be taken, continuing conciliation for a further period, or the original proposal, or some variant thereof, can be voted in the normal way.

In the event that a vote is taken after unsuccessful conciliation, the resolution will cite the report of the conciliation group (which may contain minority as well as majority views), and the records of the United Nations will show how the members voted on the resolution.

These procedures offer important benefits to all U.N. members:

For the minority of developed countries, they provide some safeguard against the voting of unacceptable resolutions by automatic majorities, and a "cooling off" period of 6 months or more during which efforts at compromise can be sought through quiet diplomacy.

For the majority of less-developed countries, they afford a means of engaging the developed countries in a sustained debate during which the developed countries explain the reasons for their opposition to proposals of the majority.

It is too early to see just how the conciliation procedure will work in practice, but we may hazard one prediction: The main value of the new procedures may be less in their actual use than in the subtle way in which their mere existence influences member governments in the direction of compromise rather than voting on disagreed proposals.

III

This catalog of procedures for coping with the "international apportionment problem" should serve to indicate four things:

First, that the United States and other countries are very much aware of the need to adapt U.N. procedures to take account of power realities.

Second, that a wide variety of alternative procedures can be developed to come to grips with the problem.

Third, that the most practical of these procedures can be put into effect without amendment of the U.N. Charter or of the constitutions of other U.N. agencies.

Fourth, that a great process of procedural adaptation and innovation is already underway throughout the U.N. system.

Of course, procedures in and of themselves are only part of the problem. What is really required is widespread recognition of the common interest in basing U.N. decisions on an adequate consensus—a consensus which includes the support of most of the countries bearing the principal responsibilities for action.

Will such a recognition be forthcoming? The cynic may ask why the majority of small countries should accept any restraint on the use of their voting power. The answer is clear enough.

If United Nations procedures cannot be adapted to take account of power realities, the large and middle powers will increasingly pursue their national interests outside the U.N. system.

If, on the other hand, the necessary procedural adjustments can be carried out, the United Nations and its agencies will be able to assume increasing responsibilities for action in both peacekeeping and development.

This is the fundamental reason why the important procedural adjustments now underway in the United Nations serve the enlightened long-term interests of all its members.

Mr. CLARK. I believe Mr. Gardner has made a significant contribution to

the problem which confronts us as we see the United Nations failing to measure up to the hopes which we all had for it back in 1945. This contribution is particularly pertinent in view of the public hearings which will shortly be held on Senate Concurrent Resolution 32, co-sponsored by 26 Senators. The hearings will begin on May 11 before the Committee on Foreign Relations.

THE SITUATION IN VIETNAM

Mr. CLARK. Mr. President, I ask unanimous consent that there may be printed in the Record at this point a column entitled "The Hidden Issue" written by Walter Lippmann and published recently in the Washington Post.

There being no objection, the article was ordered to be printed in the Record, as follows:

THE HIDDEN ISSUE

(By Walter Lippmann)

In his press conference on Tuesday, the President said that "as long as aggression continues, and as long as they bomb in South Vietnam, and as long as they bomb our sports arenas, and our theaters, and our embassies, and kill our women and children, and the Vietnamese soldiers * * * we think that we are justified in trying to slow down that operation and make them realize that it is very costly, and that their aggression should cease. * * * The moment that this aggression ceases, the destruction of their bridges and their radar stations and the ammunition that they use on our bodies will cease."

If this were a full definition of our policy, the obvious proposal to make would be an unconditional cease-fire. Under a cease-fire, all the fighting would stop, including the bombing in the south and in the north, and could be resumed only if the other side violated the truce.

There must then be a compelling reason why the President has not proposed a cease-fire, even though it fits exactly the purpose he declared at the press conference on Tuesday. There is a compelling reason why the administration has rejected the proposal of a cease-fire and has substituted for it a proposal for "unconditional discussions." The compelling reason is that a cease-fire today would leave the Vietcong with the upper hand in the eventual negotiations with Saigon and Washington. It might even precipitate a deal in South Vietnam between the Vietcong and the peace party.

The truth is that the President's advisers have a bigger purpose than the one defined in his press conference. Their aim is to reverse the existing balance of power in South Vietnam before the negotiations for the eventual settlement begin.

This is the crux of the situation today, and it has to be understood in order to understand why there is no present prospect of bringing the war to an end or even of preventing it from becoming a wider war.

The Vietcong and Hanoi, who have the upper hand in South Vietnam, will not negotiate unless their superiority is acknowledged—perhaps by a willingness on our part to deal with the National Liberation Front, which is the political arm of the Vietcong. And our real aim is to fight on until our military position, is as good or a little better than that of our adversaries.

So we must ask ourselves this question: If the objective of our military effort is the limited one described by the President in his press conference, that we will cease bombing if they will cease bombing, then the thing to do is to propose a cease-fire. Not only would this fit exactly the specifications stated by the President, but it would dispose of the

whole controversy at home and abroad about stopping or interrupting unilaterally the American bombing raids.

Before we make up our minds about proposing a cease-fire now, we have to weigh the consequences. The fundamental choice is whether or not we must and can redress the balance of power in South Vietnam before we cease fighting. If we do not redress the balance of power in South Vietnam, the Hanoi government is likely to have a dominant influence on the settlement.

The division of responsible opinion in this country today is between those, on the one hand, who think that with more bombing and with more American troops the predominance of the Vietcong and of Hanoi can be overturned—and those, on the other hand, who think that if this can be done at all, it can be done only at a price which, measured by the American interests at stake, is exorbitant.

There are those who resent, almost apoplectically, the idea that we are not omnipotent everywhere on the globe. But the sober majority of our people, the President first among them, have no appetite for unending and unlimited war in the pursuit of the mirage of victory. They want a decent and honorable end to the war, decent in that the killing and burning stop, honorable in that we do not abandon our clients and friends to the vengeance of their enemies.

Since we cannot win the war and keep it won, there are, I believe, two great forces which we must and can rely on when eventually we bargain out the terms of our leaving Saigon. They will help us preserve the independence of Vietnam against Chinese conquest. One of these forces is our own unchallenged supremacy at sea and in the air in the Pacific and in the Indian Oceans. The other force is Vietnamese nationalism which, whether Communist or not, is deeply, and it would appear permanently, resistant to Chinese imperialism.

Mr. Lippmann points out:

But the sober majority of our people, the President first among them, have no appetite for unending and unlimited war in the pursuit of the mirage of victory. They want a decent and honorable end to the war, decent in that the killing and burning stop, honorable in that we do not abandon our clients and friends to the vengeance of our enemies.

These comments of Mr. Lippmann quite accurately state my own views in this regard.

A DECENT HOME FOR EVERY AMERICAN

Mr. CLARK. Mr. President, on April 9, 1965, the Senator from New York [Mr. KENNEDY], and I testified on the Housing and Urban Development Act of 1965 before the Housing Subcommittee of the Senate Committee on Banking and Currency on behalf of Senators BAYH, HART, KENNEDY of Massachusetts, McNAMARA, MORSE, PELL, and TYDINGS, as well as ourselves.

The combined urban populations of the States represented by these nine Senators total nearly one-fifth of the American people. In our statement we endorsed the recommendations of the Johnson administration and carried them still further in proposals of our own.

I ask unanimous consent that there be printed at this point in the Record our joint statement entitled "A Decent Home for Every American."

There being no objection, the statement was ordered to be printed in the Record, as follows:

A DECENT HOME FOR EVERY AMERICAN

(Joint statement before the Housing Subcommittee of the Senate Banking and Currency Committee by U.S. Senators BIRCH BATH, JOSEPH S. CLARK, PHILIP A. HART, ROBERT F. KENNEDY, PAT McNAMARA, WAYNE MORSE, CLAIBORNE PELL, EDWARD M. KENNEDY, and JOSEPH TIDINGS, Apr. 9, 1965)

We are here to support S. 1354, the Housing and Urban Development Act of 1965.

In 1949, the Congress declared "that the general welfare and security of the Nation and the health and living standards of its people require . . . the realization as soon as feasible of the goal of a decent home and a suitable living environment for every American family."

Today, 16 years later, we are still a long way from our goal. The construction industry, assisted by a variety of Federal, State and local government actions, has built new and better housing on an unprecedented scale. But our population has increased; millions of families have changed their place of residence; and much of our housing stock has deteriorated.

As a result, one out of every four American families lives in substandard housing. Of the 58.3 million housing units in the United States in 1959, 8.4 million were deteriorating; 3.0 million were thoroughly dilapidated; and 4.8 million otherwise sound units lacked basic plumbing. By now, the figures are almost certainly worse.

Nowhere has this raised greater problems than in the core areas of our great cities. In part, this is because they are old: 57 percent of all housing units in the central cities were built before 1929, as compared with 41 percent of all housing units outside the center cities; and while 22 percent of housing outside the cities has been built in the last 10 years, only 9 percent of city housing units have been built in that same decade.

THE FLIGHT OF THE CITY POOR

In larger part, it is because poor people have been moving to the cities. City after city has received waves of migrants from marginal and depressed areas. These newcomers—too often without the education or the skills to earn a living adequate to the high cost of city living—have crowded into slums every bit as crowded, unsanitary, and dangerous as those in which earlier generations of immigrants lived. For those earlier immigrants, conditions improved as they found their place in American society.

But the present generation of poor people faces barriers to advancement which are higher and more difficult than those faced by their predecessors. An advancing technology requires nearly every worker to be as skilled, educated, and trained as were only a small and fortunate elite in past generations. And many of the present poor are elderly; or are without one or more parents; or are the victims of discrimination. We are committed to removing these handicaps—and to securing decent and dignified lives to those who labor under them.

That is why we passed the Civil Rights Act.

It is why we passed the Economic Opportunity Act.

It is why we will pass medicare and the elementary and secondary education bill.

And it is also the reason why the Federal Government should now act to fulfill the pledge of the Housing Act of 1949.

Families—whatever their income—should have access to housing which is sound and sanitary, has basic necessary facilities, and which they can afford. We think it is also clear that this housing should offer its occupants—particularly the children who live in it—an environment which, so far as possible, embodies the ideals and ways of living which those of us who are more fortunate would want and expect for our own children.

These are general aims; they require specific programs.

In our judgment, the administration's housing bill, S. 1354, is a good bill. Its emphasis is upon housing for the poor. We support its passage. But there are additions in the bill which should be made, if we are to realize our goal of a decent, safe, and sanitary home for every American family.

STRENGTHENED LOW-INCOME HOUSING PROGRAM

Our most pressing need is more housing for low-income families. The Housing and Home Finance Agency has testified that local housing authorities applied for over 94,000 public housing units last year. And were more units available, applications would surely increase; New York City alone, for example, presently has on file over 100,000 applications from people desiring admission to public housing projects.

Philadelphia has 100,000 families eligible for public housing, yet only a fraction of the public housing needed to accommodate them.

We are all disappointed that the local public housing authorities have been unable to build the number of public housing units Congress has allocated. In face of this fact, it is difficult to argue for an increase in the annual contributions for public housing, provided in this bill, desirable as that might seem.

We should take a look at why the construction of public housing is going so slowly, when the need is so great. We believe that this country can and should do better.

We should eliminate the artificial distinction between clearing a site for public housing and clearing a site for urban renewal. The act should be amended to provide the same writedown for the clearance of public housing sites as is available for urban renewal.

We should also facilitate local community-wide planning for low-income housing by making the local public housing authorities eligible for assistance under the urban planning assistance program.

We further propose:

First, that local public housing authorities should be able to make use of every federally supported program to provide low-income housing. One reason for such program variety is simply to make more housing available to low-income families; obviously, a housing authority able to assist tenants to acquire housing outside of public housing projects has wider possibilities for effective action than one which must build every unit it wishes to offer.

But a more important reason is that low-income housing should be distributed throughout the society. Tenants receiving housing assistance should not be collected in ghettos, separated from Americans of other income levels. Democratic principles are not fostered by marking off those who accept assistance from the Government. We do not segregate farmers from townspeople because the farmers receive soil bank payments. We do not put scholarship students in separate colleges. We do not list airlines which receive subsidies on a separate stock exchange, or sell the goods which are protected by high tariffs in separate stores. Neither should we mark off those who receive housing assistance to live in separate neighborhoods or, necessarily, separate buildings.

This is often thought of as a problem of race. But as was made clear in the consideration of the Economic Opportunity Act, poverty knows no color line. Seventy-eight percent of all poor people in the United States are white. And even within the great urban centers, the great majority of low-income persons are white. In the very core of New York City, for example, the island of Manhattan, there are 91,800 families with incomes under \$3,000, only 30,800 are nonwhite.

We, therefore, applaud the amendment

proposed by S. 1354 to section 402 of the Housing Act. This amendment, which would allow the local housing authority to purchase, or rehabilitate, or lease existing housing for low-income use, is a firm step in the right direction. This excellent provision can be further improved by giving local housing authorities a clear mandate to acquire an appropriate participating share of any type of housing project in which such participation would be financially feasible. It should be possible, for example, for a housing authority to share in the development of a 221(d)(3) project, by arrangement with the sponsor. It should likewise be possible for a housing authority to buy participating shares in a cooperative, or enter into advance lease agreements with a private builder for some of the rental units in a projected building or development. As long as the cost does not exceed the cost of annual contributions for a new public housing unit in the community, the Federal Government, the local housing authority, and the housing industry can only gain from such voluntary cooperation.

Further, the local housing authorities should be able to develop their own 221(d)(3) projects or use the direct low-interest rehabilitation loans of section 312 of the 1964 Housing Act. We are aware of the fights for exclusive control of these and other programs that have taken place between different groups. But we cannot now afford—if we ever could—to allow jurisdictional disputes to divert us from our main concern, which is the building of more housing. We are, therefore, in favor of making every program available to every organization—public or private—that evidences a will and ability to build such housing.

Secondly, those local housing authorities which have not performed adequately should no longer be allowed to handicap the performance of others. In not 1 year in the past 10 have all authorized public housing units been built; over this 10-year period, well over 100,000 units have been reserved and placed under contract, but not built. We are informed by the Housing and Home Finance Agency that some of these unbuild units were reserved in the early 1950's.

Such performance denies decent housing for the poor; frustrates the intent of Congress; and leads to an underestimation of the true need for public housing. We, therefore, urge that the bill be amended to provide that units on which construction has not begun 3 years after the initial reservation be returned to a general pool for allocation to localities willing and able to make use of them, which in the judgment of the Administrator are most in need of additional units. The waste of authorized units is particularly burdensome to those States which have the greatest need for public housing and are only restricted from building more by the 15-percent limitation on authorized units which may be allocated to any single State.

Third, every Federal housing program should be carefully examined—and amended where necessary—to make more direct its relevance to low-income housing. Sections 220 and 220(h), for example, have been little used because the cost limits per unit are too low for major rehabilitation of low-income units in center cities. These limits will also restrict use of the direct low-interest loans authorized under section 312 of the 1964 Housing Act when that program is funded. Every other program makes allowance for the higher cost of building in cities; so should rehabilitation. We, therefore, suggest that the Administrator be authorized, where justified by comparative cost, to increase the per unit limitations of 220 by 45 percent.

Fourth, we further propose that private bodies—nonprofit and limited profit cor-